Changelog: note multi-agent and batching

Co-authored-by: RealSid08 <RealSid08@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2025-12-02 10:58:22 +00:00
parent ed080ae988
commit 2b941ccc93

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## 1.3.0 — Unreleased ## 1.3.0 — Unreleased
### Highlights
- **Pluggable agents (Claude, Pi, Codex, Opencode):** New `inbound.reply.agent` block chooses the CLI and parser per command reply; per-agent argv builders inject the right flags/identity/prompt handling and parse NDJSON streams, enabling Pi/Codex swaps without changing templates.
### Bug Fixes ### Bug Fixes
- **Empty result field handling:** Fixed bug where Claude CLI returning `result: ""` (empty string) would cause raw JSON to be sent to WhatsApp instead of being treated as valid empty output. Changed truthy check to explicit type check in `command-reply.ts`. - **Empty result field handling:** Fixed bug where Claude CLI returning `result: ""` (empty string) would cause raw JSON to be sent to WhatsApp instead of being treated as valid empty output. Changed truthy check to explicit type check in `command-reply.ts`.
- **Response prefix on heartbeat replies:** Fixed `responsePrefix` (e.g., `🦞`) not being applied to heartbeat alert messages. The prefix was only applied in the regular message handler, not in `runReplyHeartbeat`. - **Response prefix on heartbeat replies:** Fixed `responsePrefix` (e.g., `🦞`) not being applied to heartbeat alert messages. The prefix was only applied in the regular message handler, not in `runReplyHeartbeat`.
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### Changes ### Changes
- **IPC server for relay:** The web relay now starts a Unix socket server at `~/.warelay/relay.sock`. Commands like `warelay send --provider web` automatically connect via IPC when the relay is running, falling back to direct connection otherwise. - **IPC server for relay:** The web relay now starts a Unix socket server at `~/.warelay/relay.sock`. Commands like `warelay send --provider web` automatically connect via IPC when the relay is running, falling back to direct connection otherwise.
- **Batched inbound messaging with timestamps:** When multiple WhatsApp messages queue up, theyre sent to the agent in one combined batch, each line timestamped consistently to preserve ordering and context.
- **Typing indicator after IPC send:** After sending a message via IPC (e.g., `warelay send`), the relay now automatically shows the typing indicator ("composing") to signal that more messages may be coming. - **Typing indicator after IPC send:** After sending a message via IPC (e.g., `warelay send`), the relay now automatically shows the typing indicator ("composing") to signal that more messages may be coming.
- **Auto-recovery from stuck WhatsApp sessions:** Added watchdog timer that detects when WhatsApp event emitter stops firing (e.g., after Bad MAC decryption errors) and automatically restarts the connection after 30 minutes of no message activity. Heartbeat logging now includes `minutesSinceLastMessage` and warns when >30 minutes without messages. The 30-minute timeout is intentionally longer than typical `heartbeatMinutes` configs to avoid false positives. - **Auto-recovery from stuck WhatsApp sessions:** Added watchdog timer that detects when WhatsApp event emitter stops firing (e.g., after Bad MAC decryption errors) and automatically restarts the connection after 30 minutes of no message activity. Heartbeat logging now includes `minutesSinceLastMessage` and warns when >30 minutes without messages. The 30-minute timeout is intentionally longer than typical `heartbeatMinutes` configs to avoid false positives.
- **Early allowFrom filtering:** Unauthorized senders are now blocked in `inbound.ts` BEFORE encryption/decryption attempts, preventing Bad MAC errors from corrupting session state. Previously, messages from unauthorized senders would trigger decryption failures that could silently kill the event emitter. - **Early allowFrom filtering:** Unauthorized senders are now blocked in `inbound.ts` BEFORE encryption/decryption attempts, preventing Bad MAC errors from corrupting session state. Previously, messages from unauthorized senders would trigger decryption failures that could silently kill the event emitter.