From 6f5205d826d1e01ebee5673d664661cc63ab9e08 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Steinberger Date: Sun, 18 Jan 2026 23:37:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] docs: elevate security audit callout --- docs/gateway/security.md | 14 +++++++------- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/docs/gateway/security.md b/docs/gateway/security.md index e18936fd2..04cb8ba33 100644 --- a/docs/gateway/security.md +++ b/docs/gateway/security.md @@ -5,13 +5,6 @@ read_when: --- # Security 🔒 -Running an AI agent with shell access on your machine is... *spicy*. Here’s how to not get pwned. - -Clawdbot is both a product and an experiment: you’re wiring frontier-model behavior into real messaging surfaces and real tools. **There is no “perfectly secure” setup.** The goal is to be deliberate about: -- who can talk to your bot -- where the bot is allowed to act -- what the bot can touch - ## Quick check: `clawdbot security audit` Run this regularly (especially after changing config or exposing network surfaces): @@ -29,6 +22,13 @@ It flags common footguns (Gateway auth exposure, browser control exposure, eleva - Turn `logging.redactSensitive="off"` back to `"tools"`. - Tighten local perms (`~/.clawdbot` → `700`, config file → `600`, plus common state files like `credentials/*.json`, `agents/*/agent/auth-profiles.json`, and `agents/*/sessions/sessions.json`). +Running an AI agent with shell access on your machine is... *spicy*. Here’s how to not get pwned. + +Clawdbot is both a product and an experiment: you’re wiring frontier-model behavior into real messaging surfaces and real tools. **There is no “perfectly secure” setup.** The goal is to be deliberate about: +- who can talk to your bot +- where the bot is allowed to act +- what the bot can touch + ### What the audit checks (high level) - **Inbound access** (DM policies, group policies, allowlists): can strangers trigger the bot?