feat: add security audit + onboarding checkpoint
This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
533
src/security/audit.ts
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533
src/security/audit.ts
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@@ -0,0 +1,533 @@
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import fs from "node:fs/promises";
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import { listChannelPlugins } from "../channels/plugins/index.js";
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import { resolveChannelDefaultAccountId } from "../channels/plugins/helpers.js";
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import type { ChannelId } from "../channels/plugins/types.js";
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import type { ClawdbotConfig } from "../config/config.js";
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import { CONFIG_PATH_CLAWDBOT } from "../config/config.js";
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import { resolveGatewayAuth } from "../gateway/auth.js";
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import { buildGatewayConnectionDetails } from "../gateway/call.js";
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import { probeGateway } from "../gateway/probe.js";
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import { CONFIG_DIR } from "../utils.js";
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export type SecurityAuditSeverity = "info" | "warn" | "critical";
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export type SecurityAuditFinding = {
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checkId: string;
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severity: SecurityAuditSeverity;
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title: string;
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detail: string;
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remediation?: string;
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};
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export type SecurityAuditSummary = {
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critical: number;
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warn: number;
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info: number;
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};
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export type SecurityAuditReport = {
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ts: number;
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summary: SecurityAuditSummary;
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findings: SecurityAuditFinding[];
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deep?: {
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gateway?: {
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attempted: boolean;
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url: string | null;
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ok: boolean;
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error: string | null;
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close?: { code: number; reason: string } | null;
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};
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};
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};
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export type SecurityAuditOptions = {
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config: ClawdbotConfig;
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deep?: boolean;
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includeFilesystem?: boolean;
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includeChannelSecurity?: boolean;
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/** Override where to check state (default: CONFIG_DIR). */
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stateDir?: string;
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/** Override config path check (default: CONFIG_PATH_CLAWDBOT). */
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configPath?: string;
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/** Time limit for deep gateway probe. */
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deepTimeoutMs?: number;
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/** Dependency injection for tests. */
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plugins?: ReturnType<typeof listChannelPlugins>;
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/** Dependency injection for tests. */
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probeGatewayFn?: typeof probeGateway;
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};
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function countBySeverity(findings: SecurityAuditFinding[]): SecurityAuditSummary {
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let critical = 0;
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let warn = 0;
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let info = 0;
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for (const f of findings) {
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if (f.severity === "critical") critical += 1;
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else if (f.severity === "warn") warn += 1;
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else info += 1;
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}
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return { critical, warn, info };
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}
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function normalizeAllowFromList(list: Array<string | number> | undefined | null): string[] {
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if (!Array.isArray(list)) return [];
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return list.map((v) => String(v).trim()).filter(Boolean);
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}
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function classifyChannelWarningSeverity(message: string): SecurityAuditSeverity {
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const s = message.toLowerCase();
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if (s.includes('dms: open') || s.includes('grouppolicy="open"') || s.includes('dmpolicy="open"')) {
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return "critical";
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}
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if (s.includes("allows any") || s.includes("anyone can dm") || s.includes("public")) {
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return "critical";
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}
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if (s.includes("locked") || s.includes("disabled")) {
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return "info";
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}
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return "warn";
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}
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async function safeStat(targetPath: string): Promise<{
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ok: boolean;
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isSymlink: boolean;
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isDir: boolean;
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mode: number | null;
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uid: number | null;
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gid: number | null;
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error?: string;
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}> {
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try {
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const lst = await fs.lstat(targetPath);
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return {
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ok: true,
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isSymlink: lst.isSymbolicLink(),
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isDir: lst.isDirectory(),
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mode: typeof lst.mode === "number" ? lst.mode : null,
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uid: typeof lst.uid === "number" ? lst.uid : null,
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gid: typeof lst.gid === "number" ? lst.gid : null,
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};
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} catch (err) {
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return {
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ok: false,
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isSymlink: false,
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isDir: false,
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mode: null,
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uid: null,
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gid: null,
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error: String(err),
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};
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}
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}
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function modeBits(mode: number | null): number | null {
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if (mode == null) return null;
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return mode & 0o777;
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}
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function formatOctal(bits: number | null): string {
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if (bits == null) return "unknown";
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return bits.toString(8).padStart(3, "0");
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}
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function isWorldWritable(bits: number | null): boolean {
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if (bits == null) return false;
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return (bits & 0o002) !== 0;
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}
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function isGroupWritable(bits: number | null): boolean {
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if (bits == null) return false;
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return (bits & 0o020) !== 0;
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}
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function isWorldReadable(bits: number | null): boolean {
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if (bits == null) return false;
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return (bits & 0o004) !== 0;
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}
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function isGroupReadable(bits: number | null): boolean {
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if (bits == null) return false;
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return (bits & 0o040) !== 0;
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}
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async function collectFilesystemFindings(params: {
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stateDir: string;
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configPath: string;
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}): Promise<SecurityAuditFinding[]> {
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const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
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const stateDirStat = await safeStat(params.stateDir);
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if (stateDirStat.ok) {
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const bits = modeBits(stateDirStat.mode);
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if (stateDirStat.isSymlink) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "fs.state_dir.symlink",
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severity: "warn",
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title: "State dir is a symlink",
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detail: `${params.stateDir} is a symlink; treat this as an extra trust boundary.`,
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});
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}
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if (isWorldWritable(bits)) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "fs.state_dir.perms_world_writable",
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severity: "critical",
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title: "State dir is world-writable",
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detail: `${params.stateDir} mode=${formatOctal(bits)}; other users can write into your Clawdbot state.`,
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remediation: `chmod 700 ${params.stateDir}`,
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});
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} else if (isGroupWritable(bits)) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "fs.state_dir.perms_group_writable",
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severity: "warn",
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title: "State dir is group-writable",
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detail: `${params.stateDir} mode=${formatOctal(bits)}; group users can write into your Clawdbot state.`,
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remediation: `chmod 700 ${params.stateDir}`,
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});
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} else if (isGroupReadable(bits) || isWorldReadable(bits)) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "fs.state_dir.perms_readable",
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severity: "warn",
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title: "State dir is readable by others",
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detail: `${params.stateDir} mode=${formatOctal(bits)}; consider restricting to 700.`,
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remediation: `chmod 700 ${params.stateDir}`,
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});
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}
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}
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const configStat = await safeStat(params.configPath);
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if (configStat.ok) {
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const bits = modeBits(configStat.mode);
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if (configStat.isSymlink) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "fs.config.symlink",
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severity: "warn",
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title: "Config file is a symlink",
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detail: `${params.configPath} is a symlink; make sure you trust its target.`,
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});
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}
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if (isWorldWritable(bits) || isGroupWritable(bits)) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "fs.config.perms_writable",
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severity: "critical",
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title: "Config file is writable by others",
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detail: `${params.configPath} mode=${formatOctal(bits)}; another user could change gateway/auth/tool policies.`,
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remediation: `chmod 600 ${params.configPath}`,
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});
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} else if (isWorldReadable(bits)) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "fs.config.perms_world_readable",
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severity: "critical",
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title: "Config file is world-readable",
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detail: `${params.configPath} mode=${formatOctal(bits)}; config can contain tokens and private settings.`,
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remediation: `chmod 600 ${params.configPath}`,
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});
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} else if (isGroupReadable(bits)) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "fs.config.perms_group_readable",
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severity: "warn",
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title: "Config file is group-readable",
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detail: `${params.configPath} mode=${formatOctal(bits)}; config can contain tokens and private settings.`,
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remediation: `chmod 600 ${params.configPath}`,
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});
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}
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}
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return findings;
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}
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function collectGatewayConfigFindings(cfg: ClawdbotConfig): SecurityAuditFinding[] {
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const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
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const bind = typeof cfg.gateway?.bind === "string" ? cfg.gateway.bind : "loopback";
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const tailscaleMode = cfg.gateway?.tailscale?.mode ?? "off";
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const auth = resolveGatewayAuth({ authConfig: cfg.gateway?.auth, tailscaleMode });
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if (bind !== "loopback" && auth.mode === "none") {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "gateway.bind_no_auth",
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severity: "critical",
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title: "Gateway binds beyond loopback without auth",
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detail: `gateway.bind="${bind}" but no gateway.auth token/password is configured.`,
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remediation: `Set gateway.auth (token recommended) or bind to loopback.`,
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});
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}
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if (tailscaleMode === "funnel") {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "gateway.tailscale_funnel",
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severity: "critical",
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title: "Tailscale Funnel exposure enabled",
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detail: `gateway.tailscale.mode="funnel" exposes the Gateway publicly; keep auth strict and treat it as internet-facing.`,
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remediation: `Prefer tailscale.mode="serve" (tailnet-only) or set tailscale.mode="off".`,
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});
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} else if (tailscaleMode === "serve") {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "gateway.tailscale_serve",
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severity: "info",
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title: "Tailscale Serve exposure enabled",
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detail: `gateway.tailscale.mode="serve" exposes the Gateway to your tailnet (loopback behind Tailscale).`,
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});
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}
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const token =
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typeof auth.token === "string" && auth.token.trim().length > 0 ? auth.token.trim() : null;
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if (auth.mode === "token" && token && token.length < 24) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: "gateway.token_too_short",
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severity: "warn",
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title: "Gateway token looks short",
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detail: `gateway auth token is ${token.length} chars; prefer a long random token.`,
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});
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}
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return findings;
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}
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function collectLoggingFindings(cfg: ClawdbotConfig): SecurityAuditFinding[] {
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const redact = cfg.logging?.redactSensitive;
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if (redact !== "off") return [];
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return [
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{
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checkId: "logging.redact_off",
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severity: "warn",
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title: "Tool summary redaction is disabled",
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detail: `logging.redactSensitive="off" can leak secrets into logs and status output.`,
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remediation: `Set logging.redactSensitive="tools".`,
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},
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];
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}
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function collectElevatedFindings(cfg: ClawdbotConfig): SecurityAuditFinding[] {
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const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
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const enabled = cfg.tools?.elevated?.enabled;
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const allowFrom = cfg.tools?.elevated?.allowFrom ?? {};
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const anyAllowFromKeys = Object.keys(allowFrom).length > 0;
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if (enabled === false) return findings;
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if (!anyAllowFromKeys) return findings;
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for (const [provider, list] of Object.entries(allowFrom)) {
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const normalized = normalizeAllowFromList(list);
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if (normalized.includes("*")) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider}.wildcard`,
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severity: "critical",
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title: "Elevated exec allowlist contains wildcard",
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detail: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider} includes "*" which effectively approves everyone on that channel for elevated mode.`,
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});
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} else if (normalized.length > 25) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider}.large`,
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severity: "warn",
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title: "Elevated exec allowlist is large",
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detail: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.${provider} has ${normalized.length} entries; consider tightening elevated access.`,
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});
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}
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}
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return findings;
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}
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async function collectChannelSecurityFindings(params: {
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cfg: ClawdbotConfig;
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plugins: ReturnType<typeof listChannelPlugins>;
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}): Promise<SecurityAuditFinding[]> {
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const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
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const warnDmPolicy = async (input: {
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label: string;
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provider: ChannelId;
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dmPolicy: string;
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allowFrom?: Array<string | number> | null;
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policyPath?: string;
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allowFromPath: string;
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}) => {
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const policyPath = input.policyPath ?? `${input.allowFromPath}policy`;
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const configAllowFrom = normalizeAllowFromList(input.allowFrom);
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const hasWildcard = configAllowFrom.includes("*");
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if (input.dmPolicy === "open") {
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const allowFromKey = `${input.allowFromPath}allowFrom`;
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findings.push({
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checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.open`,
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severity: "critical",
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title: `${input.label} DMs are open`,
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detail: `${policyPath}="open" allows anyone to DM the bot.`,
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remediation: `Use pairing/allowlist; if you really need open DMs, ensure ${allowFromKey} includes "*".`,
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});
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if (!hasWildcard) {
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findings.push({
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checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.open_invalid`,
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severity: "warn",
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title: `${input.label} DM config looks inconsistent`,
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detail: `"open" requires ${allowFromKey} to include "*".`,
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});
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}
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return;
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}
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if (input.dmPolicy === "disabled") {
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findings.push({
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checkId: `channels.${input.provider}.dm.disabled`,
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severity: "info",
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title: `${input.label} DMs are disabled`,
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detail: `${policyPath}="disabled" ignores inbound DMs.`,
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});
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}
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};
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for (const plugin of params.plugins) {
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if (!plugin.security) continue;
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const accountIds = plugin.config.listAccountIds(params.cfg);
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const defaultAccountId = resolveChannelDefaultAccountId({
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plugin,
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cfg: params.cfg,
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accountIds,
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});
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const account = plugin.config.resolveAccount(params.cfg, defaultAccountId);
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const enabled = plugin.config.isEnabled ? plugin.config.isEnabled(account, params.cfg) : true;
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if (!enabled) continue;
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const configured = plugin.config.isConfigured
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? await plugin.config.isConfigured(account, params.cfg)
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: true;
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if (!configured) continue;
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const dmPolicy = plugin.security.resolveDmPolicy?.({
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cfg: params.cfg,
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accountId: defaultAccountId,
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account,
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});
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if (dmPolicy) {
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await warnDmPolicy({
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label: plugin.meta.label ?? plugin.id,
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provider: plugin.id,
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dmPolicy: dmPolicy.policy,
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allowFrom: dmPolicy.allowFrom,
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policyPath: dmPolicy.policyPath,
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allowFromPath: dmPolicy.allowFromPath,
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});
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}
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if (plugin.security.collectWarnings) {
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const warnings = await plugin.security.collectWarnings({
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cfg: params.cfg,
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accountId: defaultAccountId,
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account,
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});
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for (const message of warnings ?? []) {
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const trimmed = String(message).trim();
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if (!trimmed) continue;
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findings.push({
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checkId: `channels.${plugin.id}.warning.${findings.length + 1}`,
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severity: classifyChannelWarningSeverity(trimmed),
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title: `${plugin.meta.label ?? plugin.id} security warning`,
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detail: trimmed.replace(/^-\s*/, ""),
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});
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}
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}
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}
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return findings;
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}
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async function maybeProbeGateway(params: {
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cfg: ClawdbotConfig;
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timeoutMs: number;
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probe: typeof probeGateway;
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}): Promise<SecurityAuditReport["deep"]> {
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const connection = buildGatewayConnectionDetails({ config: params.cfg });
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const url = connection.url;
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const isRemoteMode = params.cfg.gateway?.mode === "remote";
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const remoteUrlRaw =
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typeof params.cfg.gateway?.remote?.url === "string" ? params.cfg.gateway.remote.url.trim() : "";
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const remoteUrlMissing = isRemoteMode && !remoteUrlRaw;
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const resolveAuth = (mode: "local" | "remote") => {
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const authToken = params.cfg.gateway?.auth?.token;
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const authPassword = params.cfg.gateway?.auth?.password;
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const remote = params.cfg.gateway?.remote;
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const token =
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mode === "remote"
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? typeof remote?.token === "string" && remote.token.trim()
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? remote.token.trim()
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: undefined
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: process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_TOKEN?.trim() ||
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(typeof authToken === "string" && authToken.trim() ? authToken.trim() : undefined);
|
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const password =
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process.env.CLAWDBOT_GATEWAY_PASSWORD?.trim() ||
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(mode === "remote"
|
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? typeof remote?.password === "string" && remote.password.trim()
|
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? remote.password.trim()
|
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: undefined
|
||||
: typeof authPassword === "string" && authPassword.trim()
|
||||
? authPassword.trim()
|
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: undefined);
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return { token, password };
|
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};
|
||||
|
||||
const auth = remoteUrlMissing ? resolveAuth("local") : resolveAuth("remote");
|
||||
const res = await params.probe({ url, auth, timeoutMs: params.timeoutMs }).catch((err) => ({
|
||||
ok: false,
|
||||
url,
|
||||
connectLatencyMs: null,
|
||||
error: String(err),
|
||||
close: null,
|
||||
health: null,
|
||||
status: null,
|
||||
presence: null,
|
||||
configSnapshot: null,
|
||||
}));
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
gateway: {
|
||||
attempted: true,
|
||||
url,
|
||||
ok: res.ok,
|
||||
error: res.ok ? null : res.error,
|
||||
close: res.close ? { code: res.close.code, reason: res.close.reason } : null,
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export async function runSecurityAudit(opts: SecurityAuditOptions): Promise<SecurityAuditReport> {
|
||||
const findings: SecurityAuditFinding[] = [];
|
||||
const cfg = opts.config;
|
||||
const stateDir = opts.stateDir ?? CONFIG_DIR;
|
||||
const configPath = opts.configPath ?? CONFIG_PATH_CLAWDBOT;
|
||||
|
||||
findings.push(...collectGatewayConfigFindings(cfg));
|
||||
findings.push(...collectLoggingFindings(cfg));
|
||||
findings.push(...collectElevatedFindings(cfg));
|
||||
|
||||
if (opts.includeFilesystem !== false) {
|
||||
findings.push(...(await collectFilesystemFindings({ stateDir, configPath })));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (opts.includeChannelSecurity !== false) {
|
||||
const plugins = opts.plugins ?? listChannelPlugins();
|
||||
findings.push(...(await collectChannelSecurityFindings({ cfg, plugins })));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const deep =
|
||||
opts.deep === true
|
||||
? await maybeProbeGateway({
|
||||
cfg,
|
||||
timeoutMs: Math.max(250, opts.deepTimeoutMs ?? 5000),
|
||||
probe: opts.probeGatewayFn ?? probeGateway,
|
||||
})
|
||||
: undefined;
|
||||
|
||||
if (deep?.gateway?.attempted && deep.gateway.ok === false) {
|
||||
findings.push({
|
||||
checkId: "gateway.probe_failed",
|
||||
severity: "warn",
|
||||
title: "Gateway probe failed (deep)",
|
||||
detail: deep.gateway.error ?? "gateway unreachable",
|
||||
remediation: `Run "clawdbot status --all" to debug connectivity/auth, then re-run "clawdbot security audit --deep".`,
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const summary = countBySeverity(findings);
|
||||
return { ts: Date.now(), summary, findings, deep };
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user