docs: clarify browser allowlist defaults and risks
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@@ -199,6 +199,15 @@ Also consider agent workspace access inside the sandbox:
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Important: `tools.elevated` is the global baseline escape hatch that runs bash on the host. Keep `tools.elevated.allowFrom` tight and don’t enable it for strangers. You can further restrict elevated per agent via `agents.list[].tools.elevated`. See [Elevated Mode](/tools/elevated).
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## Browser control risks
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Enabling browser control gives the model the ability to drive a real browser.
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If that browser profile already contains logged-in sessions, the model can
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access those accounts and data. Treat browser profiles as **sensitive state**:
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- Prefer a dedicated profile for the agent (the default `clawd` profile).
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- Avoid pointing the agent at your personal daily-driver profile.
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- Keep host browser control disabled for sandboxed agents unless you trust them.
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## Per-agent access profiles (multi-agent)
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With multi-agent routing, each agent can have its own sandbox + tool policy:
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