docs: clarify browser allowlist defaults and risks

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Peter Steinberger
2026-01-11 01:55:38 +01:00
parent a32021dc3e
commit fe46a2663b
3 changed files with 11 additions and 0 deletions

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@@ -199,6 +199,15 @@ Also consider agent workspace access inside the sandbox:
Important: `tools.elevated` is the global baseline escape hatch that runs bash on the host. Keep `tools.elevated.allowFrom` tight and dont enable it for strangers. You can further restrict elevated per agent via `agents.list[].tools.elevated`. See [Elevated Mode](/tools/elevated).
## Browser control risks
Enabling browser control gives the model the ability to drive a real browser.
If that browser profile already contains logged-in sessions, the model can
access those accounts and data. Treat browser profiles as **sensitive state**:
- Prefer a dedicated profile for the agent (the default `clawd` profile).
- Avoid pointing the agent at your personal daily-driver profile.
- Keep host browser control disabled for sandboxed agents unless you trust them.
## Per-agent access profiles (multi-agent)
With multi-agent routing, each agent can have its own sandbox + tool policy: