---
title: Formal Verification (Security Models)
summary: Machine-checked security models for Clawdbot’s highest-risk paths.
permalink: /security/formal-verification/
---

# Formal Verification (Security Models)

This page tracks Clawdbot’s **formal security models** (TLA+/TLC today; more as needed).

**Goal (north star):** provide a machine-checked argument that Clawdbot enforces its
intended security policy (authorization, session isolation, tool gating, and
misconfiguration safety), under explicit assumptions.

**What this is (today):** an executable, attacker-driven **security regression suite**:
- Each claim has a runnable model-check over a finite state space.
- Many claims have a paired **negative model** that produces a counterexample trace for a realistic bug class.

**What this is not (yet):** a proof that “Clawdbot is secure in all respects” or that the full TypeScript implementation is correct.

## Where the models live

Models are maintained in a separate repo: [vignesh07/clawdbot-formal-models](https://github.com/vignesh07/clawdbot-formal-models).

## Important caveats

- These are **models**, not the full TypeScript implementation. Drift between model and code is possible.
- Results are bounded by the state space explored by TLC; “green” does not imply security beyond the modeled assumptions and bounds.
- Some claims rely on explicit environmental assumptions (e.g., correct deployment, correct configuration inputs).

## Reproducing results

Today, results are reproduced by cloning the models repo locally and running TLC (see below). A future iteration could offer:
- CI-run models with public artifacts (counterexample traces, run logs)
- a hosted “run this model” workflow for small, bounded checks

Getting started:

```bash
git clone https://github.com/vignesh07/clawdbot-formal-models
cd clawdbot-formal-models

# Java 11+ required (TLC runs on the JVM).
# The repo vendors a pinned `tla2tools.jar` (TLA+ tools) and provides `bin/tlc` + Make targets.

make <target>
```

### Gateway exposure and open gateway misconfiguration

**Claim:** binding beyond loopback without auth can make remote compromise possible / increases exposure; token/password blocks unauth attackers (per the model assumptions).

- Green runs:
  - `make gateway-exposure-v2`
  - `make gateway-exposure-v2-protected`
- Red (expected):
  - `make gateway-exposure-v2-negative`

See also: `docs/gateway-exposure-matrix.md` in the models repo.

### Nodes.run pipeline (highest-risk capability)

**Claim:** `nodes.run` requires (a) node command allowlist plus declared commands and (b) live approval when configured; approvals are tokenized to prevent replay (in the model).

- Green runs:
  - `make nodes-pipeline`
  - `make approvals-token`
- Red (expected):
  - `make nodes-pipeline-negative`
  - `make approvals-token-negative`

### Pairing store (DM gating)

**Claim:** pairing requests respect TTL and pending-request caps.

- Green runs:
  - `make pairing`
  - `make pairing-cap`
- Red (expected):
  - `make pairing-negative`
  - `make pairing-cap-negative`

### Ingress gating (mentions + control-command bypass)

**Claim:** in group contexts requiring mention, an unauthorized “control command” cannot bypass mention gating.

- Green:
  - `make ingress-gating`
- Red (expected):
  - `make ingress-gating-negative`

### Routing/session-key isolation

**Claim:** DMs from distinct peers do not collapse into the same session unless explicitly linked/configured.

- Green:
  - `make routing-isolation`
- Red (expected):
  - `make routing-isolation-negative`

## Roadmap

Next models to deepen fidelity:
- Pairing store concurrency/locking/idempotency
- Provider-specific ingress preflight modeling
- Routing identity-links + dmScope variants + binding precedence
- Gateway auth conformance (proxy/tailscale specifics)