clawdbot/docs/security/formal-verification.md

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Formal Verification (Security Models)	Machine-checked security models for Moltbot’s highest-risk paths.	/security/formal-verification/

Formal Verification (Security Models)

This page tracks Moltbot’s formal security models (TLA+/TLC today; more as needed).

Goal (north star): provide a machine-checked argument that Moltbot enforces its intended security policy (authorization, session isolation, tool gating, and misconfiguration safety), under explicit assumptions.

What this is (today): an executable, attacker-driven security regression suite:

• Each claim has a runnable model-check over a finite state space.
• Many claims have a paired negative model that produces a counterexample trace for a realistic bug class.

What this is not (yet): a proof that “Moltbot is secure in all respects” or that the full TypeScript implementation is correct.

Where the models live

Models are maintained in a separate repo: vignesh07/moltbot-formal-models.

Important caveats

• These are models, not the full TypeScript implementation. Drift between model and code is possible.
• Results are bounded by the state space explored by TLC; “green” does not imply security beyond the modeled assumptions and bounds.
• Some claims rely on explicit environmental assumptions (e.g., correct deployment, correct configuration inputs).

Reproducing results

Today, results are reproduced by cloning the models repo locally and running TLC (see below). A future iteration could offer:

• CI-run models with public artifacts (counterexample traces, run logs)
• a hosted “run this model” workflow for small, bounded checks

Getting started:

git clone https://github.com/vignesh07/moltbot-formal-models
cd moltbot-formal-models

# Java 11+ required (TLC runs on the JVM).
# The repo vendors a pinned `tla2tools.jar` (TLA+ tools) and provides `bin/tlc` + Make targets.

make <target>

Gateway exposure and open gateway misconfiguration

Claim: binding beyond loopback without auth can make remote compromise possible / increases exposure; token/password blocks unauth attackers (per the model assumptions).

• Green runs:
  • make gateway-exposure-v2
  • make gateway-exposure-v2-protected
• Red (expected):
  • make gateway-exposure-v2-negative

See also: docs/gateway-exposure-matrix.md in the models repo.

Nodes.run pipeline (highest-risk capability)

Claim: nodes.run requires (a) node command allowlist plus declared commands and (b) live approval when configured; approvals are tokenized to prevent replay (in the model).

• Green runs:
  • make nodes-pipeline
  • make approvals-token
• Red (expected):
  • make nodes-pipeline-negative
  • make approvals-token-negative

Pairing store (DM gating)

Claim: pairing requests respect TTL and pending-request caps.

• Green runs:
  • make pairing
  • make pairing-cap
• Red (expected):
  • make pairing-negative
  • make pairing-cap-negative

Ingress gating (mentions + control-command bypass)

Claim: in group contexts requiring mention, an unauthorized “control command” cannot bypass mention gating.

• Green:
  • make ingress-gating
• Red (expected):
  • make ingress-gating-negative

Routing/session-key isolation

Claim: DMs from distinct peers do not collapse into the same session unless explicitly linked/configured.

• Green:
  • make routing-isolation
• Red (expected):
  • make routing-isolation-negative

Roadmap

Next models to deepen fidelity:

• Pairing store concurrency/locking/idempotency
• Provider-specific ingress preflight modeling
• Routing identity-links + dmScope variants + binding precedence
• Gateway auth conformance (proxy/tailscale specifics)