fix: per-agent sandbox overrides

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-01-07 12:24:12 +01:00
parent e13225c9d1
commit 573fe74a9c
13 changed files with 138 additions and 223 deletions

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@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
- Pairing: lock + atomically write pairing stores with 0600 perms and stop logging pairing codes in provider logs.
- Discord: include all inbound attachments in `MediaPaths`/`MediaUrls` (back-compat `MediaPath`/`MediaUrl` still first).
- Sandbox: add `agent.sandbox.workspaceAccess` (`none`/`ro`/`rw`) to control agent workspace visibility inside the container; `ro` hard-disables `write`/`edit`.
- Routing: allow per-agent sandbox overrides (including `workspaceAccess` and `sandbox.tools`) plus per-agent tool policies in multi-agent configs. Thanks @pasogott for PR #380.
- Tools: add Telegram/WhatsApp reaction tools (with per-provider gating). Thanks @zats for PR #353.
- Tools: unify reaction removal semantics across Discord/Slack/Telegram/WhatsApp and allow WhatsApp reaction routing across accounts.
- Gateway/CLI: add daemon runtime selection (Node recommended; Bun optional) and document WhatsApp/Baileys Bun WebSocket instability on reconnect.

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@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
# PR: Agent-specific Sandbox and Tool Configuration
## Summary
Adds support for per-agent sandbox and tool configurations in multi-agent setups. This allows running multiple agents with different security profiles (e.g., personal assistant with full access, family bot with read-only restrictions).
## Changes
### Core Implementation (5 files, +49 LoC)
1. **`src/config/types.ts`** (+4 lines)
- Added `sandbox` and `tools` fields to `routing.agents[agentId]` type
2. **`src/config/zod-schema.ts`** (+6 lines)
- Added Zod validation for `routing.agents[].sandbox` and `routing.agents[].tools`
3. **`src/agents/agent-scope.ts`** (+12 lines)
- Extended `resolveAgentConfig()` to return `sandbox` and `tools` fields
4. **`src/agents/sandbox.ts`** (+12 lines)
- Modified `defaultSandboxConfig()` to accept `agentId` parameter
- Added logic to prefer agent-specific sandbox config over global config
- Updated `resolveSandboxContext()` and `ensureSandboxWorkspaceForSession()` to extract and pass `agentId`
5. **`src/agents/pi-tools.ts`** (+15 lines)
- Added agent-specific tool filtering before sandbox tool filtering
- Imports `resolveAgentConfig` and `resolveAgentIdFromSessionKey`
### Tests (3 new test files, 18 tests)
1. **`src/agents/agent-scope.test.ts`** (7 tests)
- Tests for `resolveAgentConfig()` with sandbox and tools fields
2. **`src/agents/sandbox-agent-config.test.ts`** (6 tests)
- Tests for agent-specific sandbox mode, scope, and workspaceRoot overrides
- Tests for multiple agents with different sandbox configs
3. **`src/agents/pi-tools-agent-config.test.ts`** (5 tests)
- Tests for agent-specific tool filtering
- Tests for combined global + agent + sandbox tool policies
### Documentation (3 files)
1. **`docs/multi-agent-sandbox-tools.md`** (new)
- Comprehensive guide for per-agent sandbox and tool configuration
- Examples for common use cases
- Migration guide from single-agent configs
2. **`docs/concepts/multi-agent.md`** (updated)
- Added section on per-agent sandbox and tool configuration
- Link to detailed guide
3. **`docs/gateway/configuration.md`** (updated)
- Added documentation for `routing.agents[].sandbox` and `routing.agents[].tools` fields
## Features
### Agent-specific Sandbox Config
```json
{
"routing": {
"agents": {
"main": {
"workspace": "~/clawd",
"sandbox": { "mode": "off" }
},
"family": {
"workspace": "~/clawd-family",
"sandbox": {
"mode": "all",
"scope": "agent"
}
}
}
}
}
```
**Result:**
- `main` agent runs on host (no Docker)
- `family` agent runs in Docker with one container per agent
### Agent-specific Tool Restrictions
```json
{
"routing": {
"agents": {
"family": {
"workspace": "~/clawd-family",
"tools": {
"allow": ["read"],
"deny": ["bash", "write", "edit", "process"]
}
}
}
}
}
```
**Result:**
- `family` agent can only use the `read` tool
- All other tools are denied
## Configuration Precedence
### Sandbox Config
Agent-specific settings override global:
- `routing.agents[id].sandbox.mode` > `agent.sandbox.mode`
- `routing.agents[id].sandbox.scope` > `agent.sandbox.scope`
- `routing.agents[id].sandbox.workspaceRoot` > `agent.sandbox.workspaceRoot`
Note: `docker`, `browser`, `tools`, and `prune` settings from `agent.sandbox` remain global.
### Tool Filtering
Filtering order (each level can only further restrict):
1. Global tool policy (`agent.tools`)
2. **Agent-specific tool policy** (`routing.agents[id].tools`) ← NEW
3. Sandbox tool policy (`agent.sandbox.tools`)
4. Subagent tool policy (if applicable)
## Backward Compatibility
**100% backward compatible**
- All existing configs work unchanged
- New fields (`routing.agents[].sandbox`, `routing.agents[].tools`) are optional
- Default behavior: if no agent-specific config exists, use global config
- All 1325 existing tests pass
## Testing
### New Tests: 18 tests, all passing
```
✓ src/agents/agent-scope.test.ts (7 tests)
✓ src/agents/sandbox-agent-config.test.ts (6 tests)
✓ src/agents/pi-tools-agent-config.test.ts (5 tests)
```
### Existing Tests: All passing
```
Test Files 227 passed | 2 skipped (229)
Tests 1325 passed | 2 skipped (1327)
```
Specifically verified:
- Discord provider tests: ✓ 23 tests
- Telegram provider tests: ✓ 42 tests
- Routing tests: ✓ 7 tests
- Gateway tests: ✓ All passed
## Use Cases
### Use Case 1: Personal Assistant + Restricted Family Bot
- Personal agent: Host, all tools
- Family agent: Docker, read-only
### Use Case 2: Work Agent with Limited Access
- Personal agent: Full access
- Work agent: Docker, no browser/gateway tools
### Use Case 3: Public-facing Bot
- Main agent: Trusted, full access
- Public agent: Always sandboxed, minimal tools
## Migration Path
**Before (global config):**
```json
{
"agent": {
"sandbox": { "mode": "non-main" }
}
}
```
**After (per-agent config):**
```json
{
"routing": {
"agents": {
"main": { "sandbox": { "mode": "off" } },
"family": { "sandbox": { "mode": "all", "scope": "agent" } }
}
}
}
```
## Related Issues
- Addresses need for per-agent security policies in multi-agent setups
- Complements existing multi-agent routing feature (introduced in 7360abad)
- Prepares for upcoming `clawdbot agents` CLI (announced 2026-01-07)
## Checklist
- [x] Code changes implemented
- [x] Tests written and passing
- [x] Documentation updated
- [x] Backward compatibility verified
- [x] No breaking changes
- [x] TypeScript types updated
- [x] Zod schema validation added

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@@ -168,4 +168,4 @@ Starting with v2026.1.6, each agent can have its own sandbox and tool restrictio
- **Resource control**: Sandbox specific agents while keeping others on host
- **Flexible policies**: Different permissions per agent
See [Multi-Agent Sandbox & Tools](/docs/multi-agent-sandbox-tools) for detailed examples.
See [Multi-Agent Sandbox & Tools](/multi-agent-sandbox-tools) for detailed examples.

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@@ -336,8 +336,10 @@ Run multiple isolated agents (separate workspace, `agentDir`, sessions) inside o
- `model`: per-agent default model (provider/model), overrides `agent.model` for that agent.
- `sandbox`: per-agent sandbox config (overrides `agent.sandbox`).
- `mode`: `"off"` | `"non-main"` | `"all"`
- `workspaceAccess`: `"none"` | `"ro"` | `"rw"`
- `scope`: `"session"` | `"agent"` | `"shared"`
- `workspaceRoot`: custom sandbox workspace root
- `tools`: per-agent sandbox tool policy (deny wins; overrides `agent.sandbox.tools`)
- `tools`: per-agent tool restrictions (applied before sandbox tool policy).
- `allow`: array of allowed tool names
- `deny`: array of denied tool names (deny wins)

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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
## Overview
Each agent in a multi-agent setup can now have its own:
- **Sandbox configuration** (`mode`, `scope`, `workspaceRoot`)
- **Sandbox configuration** (`mode`, `scope`, `workspaceRoot`, `workspaceAccess`, `tools`)
- **Tool restrictions** (`allow`, `deny`)
This allows you to run multiple agents with different security profiles:
@@ -141,9 +141,10 @@ Agent-specific settings override global:
routing.agents[id].sandbox.mode > agent.sandbox.mode
routing.agents[id].sandbox.scope > agent.sandbox.scope
routing.agents[id].sandbox.workspaceRoot > agent.sandbox.workspaceRoot
routing.agents[id].sandbox.workspaceAccess > agent.sandbox.workspaceAccess
```
**Note:** `docker`, `browser`, `tools`, and `prune` settings from `agent.sandbox` are still **global** and apply to all sandboxed agents.
**Note:** `docker`, `browser`, and `prune` settings from `agent.sandbox` are still **global** and apply to all sandboxed agents.
### Tool Restrictions
The filtering order is:
@@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ The filtering order is:
4. **Subagent tool policy** (if applicable)
Each level can further restrict tools, but cannot grant back denied tools from earlier levels.
If `routing.agents[id].sandbox.tools` is set, it replaces `agent.sandbox.tools` for that agent.
---

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@@ -55,7 +55,12 @@ describe("resolveAgentConfig", () => {
mode: "all",
scope: "agent",
perSession: false,
workspaceAccess: "ro",
workspaceRoot: "~/sandboxes",
tools: {
allow: ["read"],
deny: ["bash"],
},
},
},
},
@@ -66,7 +71,12 @@ describe("resolveAgentConfig", () => {
mode: "all",
scope: "agent",
perSession: false,
workspaceAccess: "ro",
workspaceRoot: "~/sandboxes",
tools: {
allow: ["read"],
deny: ["bash"],
},
});
});

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@@ -29,9 +29,14 @@ export function resolveAgentConfig(
model?: string;
sandbox?: {
mode?: "off" | "non-main" | "all";
workspaceAccess?: "none" | "ro" | "rw";
scope?: "session" | "agent" | "shared";
perSession?: boolean;
workspaceRoot?: string;
tools?: {
allow?: string[];
deny?: string[];
};
};
tools?: {
allow?: string[];

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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import type { ClawdbotConfig } from "../config/config.js";
import { createClawdbotCodingTools } from "./pi-tools.js";
import type { SandboxDockerConfig } from "./sandbox.js";
describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
it("should apply global tool policy when no agent-specific policy exists", () => {
@@ -188,7 +189,15 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
workspaceAccess: "none",
containerName: "test-container",
containerWorkdir: "/workspace",
docker: {} as any,
docker: {
image: "test-image",
containerPrefix: "test-",
workdir: "/workspace",
readOnlyRoot: true,
tmpfs: [],
network: "none",
capDrop: [],
} satisfies SandboxDockerConfig,
tools: {
allow: ["read", "write", "bash"],
deny: [],

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@@ -596,7 +596,7 @@ export function createClawdbotCodingTools(options?: {
options.config.agent.tools.deny?.length)
? filterToolsByPolicy(filtered, options.config.agent.tools)
: filtered;
// Agent-specific tool policy
let agentFiltered = globallyFiltered;
if (options?.sessionKey && options?.config) {
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ export function createClawdbotCodingTools(options?: {
agentFiltered = filterToolsByPolicy(globallyFiltered, agentConfig.tools);
}
}
const sandboxed = sandbox
? filterToolsByPolicy(agentFiltered, sandbox.tools)
: agentFiltered;

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@@ -1,13 +1,33 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { EventEmitter } from "node:events";
import { Readable } from "node:stream";
import { describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import type { ClawdbotConfig } from "../config/config.js";
// We need to test the internal defaultSandboxConfig function, but it's not exported.
// Instead, we test the behavior through resolveSandboxContext which uses it.
vi.mock("node:child_process", async (importOriginal) => {
const actual = await importOriginal<typeof import("node:child_process")>();
return {
...actual,
spawn: () => {
const child = new EventEmitter() as {
stdout?: Readable;
stderr?: Readable;
on: (event: string, cb: (...args: unknown[]) => void) => void;
};
child.stdout = new Readable({ read() {} });
child.stderr = new Readable({ read() {} });
queueMicrotask(() => child.emit("close", 0));
return child;
},
};
});
describe("Agent-specific sandbox config", () => {
it("should use global sandbox config when no agent-specific config exists", async () => {
const { resolveSandboxContext } = await import("./sandbox.js");
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
agent: {
sandbox: {
@@ -36,7 +56,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific sandbox config", () => {
it("should override with agent-specific sandbox mode 'off'", async () => {
const { resolveSandboxContext } = await import("./sandbox.js");
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
agent: {
sandbox: {
@@ -68,7 +88,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific sandbox config", () => {
it("should use agent-specific sandbox mode 'all'", async () => {
const { resolveSandboxContext } = await import("./sandbox.js");
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
agent: {
sandbox: {
@@ -100,7 +120,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific sandbox config", () => {
it("should use agent-specific scope", async () => {
const { resolveSandboxContext } = await import("./sandbox.js");
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
agent: {
sandbox: {
@@ -134,7 +154,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific sandbox config", () => {
it("should use agent-specific workspaceRoot", async () => {
const { resolveSandboxContext } = await import("./sandbox.js");
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
agent: {
sandbox: {
@@ -169,7 +189,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific sandbox config", () => {
it("should prefer agent config over global for multiple agents", async () => {
const { resolveSandboxContext } = await import("./sandbox.js");
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
agent: {
sandbox: {
@@ -213,4 +233,48 @@ describe("Agent-specific sandbox config", () => {
expect(familyContext).toBeDefined();
expect(familyContext?.enabled).toBe(true);
});
it("should prefer agent-specific sandbox tool policy", async () => {
const { resolveSandboxContext } = await import("./sandbox.js");
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
agent: {
sandbox: {
mode: "all",
scope: "agent",
tools: {
allow: ["read"],
deny: ["bash"],
},
},
},
routing: {
agents: {
restricted: {
workspace: "~/clawd-restricted",
sandbox: {
mode: "all",
scope: "agent",
tools: {
allow: ["read", "write"],
deny: ["edit"],
},
},
},
},
},
};
const context = await resolveSandboxContext({
config: cfg,
sessionKey: "agent:restricted:main",
workspaceDir: "/tmp/test-restricted",
});
expect(context).toBeDefined();
expect(context?.tools).toEqual({
allow: ["read", "write"],
deny: ["edit"],
});
});
});

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@@ -226,9 +226,12 @@ function resolveSandboxScopeKey(scope: SandboxScope, sessionKey: string) {
return `agent:${agentId}`;
}
function defaultSandboxConfig(cfg?: ClawdbotConfig, agentId?: string): SandboxConfig {
function defaultSandboxConfig(
cfg?: ClawdbotConfig,
agentId?: string,
): SandboxConfig {
const agent = cfg?.agent?.sandbox;
// Agent-specific sandbox config overrides global
let agentSandbox: typeof agent | undefined;
if (agentId && cfg?.routing?.agents) {
@@ -237,15 +240,19 @@ function defaultSandboxConfig(cfg?: ClawdbotConfig, agentId?: string): SandboxCo
agentSandbox = agentConfig.sandbox;
}
}
return {
mode: agentSandbox?.mode ?? agent?.mode ?? "off",
scope: resolveSandboxScope({
scope: agentSandbox?.scope ?? agent?.scope,
perSession: agentSandbox?.perSession ?? agent?.perSession,
}),
workspaceAccess: agentSandbox?.workspaceAccess ?? agent?.workspaceAccess ?? "none",
workspaceRoot: agentSandbox?.workspaceRoot ?? agent?.workspaceRoot ?? DEFAULT_SANDBOX_WORKSPACE_ROOT,
workspaceAccess:
agentSandbox?.workspaceAccess ?? agent?.workspaceAccess ?? "none",
workspaceRoot:
agentSandbox?.workspaceRoot ??
agent?.workspaceRoot ??
DEFAULT_SANDBOX_WORKSPACE_ROOT,
docker: {
image: agent?.docker?.image ?? DEFAULT_SANDBOX_IMAGE,
containerPrefix:
@@ -281,8 +288,10 @@ function defaultSandboxConfig(cfg?: ClawdbotConfig, agentId?: string): SandboxCo
enableNoVnc: agent?.browser?.enableNoVnc ?? true,
},
tools: {
allow: agent?.tools?.allow ?? DEFAULT_TOOL_ALLOW,
deny: agent?.tools?.deny ?? DEFAULT_TOOL_DENY,
allow:
agentSandbox?.tools?.allow ?? agent?.tools?.allow ?? DEFAULT_TOOL_ALLOW,
deny:
agentSandbox?.tools?.deny ?? agent?.tools?.deny ?? DEFAULT_TOOL_DENY,
},
prune: {
idleHours: agent?.prune?.idleHours ?? DEFAULT_SANDBOX_IDLE_HOURS,

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@@ -586,11 +586,18 @@ export type RoutingConfig = {
model?: string;
sandbox?: {
mode?: "off" | "non-main" | "all";
/** Agent workspace access inside the sandbox. */
workspaceAccess?: "none" | "ro" | "rw";
/** Container/workspace scope for sandbox isolation. */
scope?: "session" | "agent" | "shared";
/** Legacy alias for scope ("session" when true, "shared" when false). */
perSession?: boolean;
workspaceRoot?: string;
/** Tool allow/deny policy for sandboxed sessions (deny wins). */
tools?: {
allow?: string[];
deny?: string[];
};
};
tools?: {
allow?: string[];

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@@ -236,6 +236,9 @@ const RoutingSchema = z
z.literal("all"),
])
.optional(),
workspaceAccess: z
.union([z.literal("none"), z.literal("ro"), z.literal("rw")])
.optional(),
scope: z
.union([
z.literal("session"),
@@ -245,6 +248,12 @@ const RoutingSchema = z
.optional(),
perSession: z.boolean().optional(),
workspaceRoot: z.string().optional(),
tools: z
.object({
allow: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
deny: z.array(z.string()).optional(),
})
.optional(),
})
.optional(),
tools: z