fix: rename bash tool to exec (#748) (thanks @myfunc)

This commit is contained in:
Peter Steinberger
2026-01-12 02:49:55 +00:00
parent b33bd6aaeb
commit 98337a14b3
51 changed files with 294 additions and 252 deletions

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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
- Docs: add beginner-friendly plugin quick start + expand Voice Call plugin docs.
- Tests: add Docker plugin loader + tgz-install smoke test.
- Tests: extend Docker plugin E2E to cover installing from local folders (`plugins.load.paths`) and `file:` npm specs.
- Agents/Tools: rename the bash tool to exec (config alias maintained). (#748) — thanks @myfunc.
- Config: add `$include` directive for modular config files. (#731) — thanks @pasogott.
- Build: set pnpm minimum release age to 2880 minutes (2 days). (#718) — thanks @dan-dr.
- macOS: prompt to install the global `clawdbot` CLI when missing in local mode; install via `clawd.bot/install-cli.sh` (no onboarding) and use external launchd/CLI instead of the embedded gateway runtime.

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@@ -200,9 +200,9 @@ Details: [Tailscale guide](https://docs.clawd.bot/tailscale) · [Web surfaces](h
Its perfectly fine to run the Gateway on a small Linux instance. Clients (macOS app, CLI, WebChat) can connect over **Tailscale Serve/Funnel** or **SSH tunnels**, and you can still pair device nodes (macOS/iOS/Android) to execute devicelocal actions when needed.
- **Gateway host** runs the bash tool and provider connections by default.
- **Gateway host** runs the exec tool and provider connections by default.
- **Device nodes** run devicelocal actions (`system.run`, camera, screen recording, notifications) via `node.invoke`.
In short: bash runs where the Gateway lives; device actions run where the device lives.
In short: exec runs where the Gateway lives; device actions run where the device lives.
Details: [Remote access](https://docs.clawd.bot/remote) · [Nodes](https://docs.clawd.bot/nodes) · [Security](https://docs.clawd.bot/security)

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@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ In group `120363403215116621@g.us` with agents `["alfred", "baerbel"]`:
Session: agent:alfred:whatsapp:group:120363403215116621@g.us
History: [user message, alfred's previous responses]
Workspace: /Users/pascal/clawd-alfred/
Tools: read, write, bash
Tools: read, write, exec
```
**Bärbel's context:**
@@ -230,10 +230,10 @@ Give agents only the tools they need:
{
"agents": {
"reviewer": {
"tools": { "allow": ["read", "bash"] } // Read-only
"tools": { "allow": ["read", "exec"] } // Read-only
},
"fixer": {
"tools": { "allow": ["read", "write", "edit", "bash"] } // Read-write
"tools": { "allow": ["read", "write", "edit", "exec"] } // Read-write
}
}
}
@@ -330,8 +330,8 @@ tail -f ~/.clawdbot/logs/gateway.log | grep broadcast
"agents": {
"list": [
{ "id": "code-formatter", "workspace": "~/agents/formatter", "tools": { "allow": ["read", "write"] } },
{ "id": "security-scanner", "workspace": "~/agents/security", "tools": { "allow": ["read", "bash"] } },
{ "id": "test-coverage", "workspace": "~/agents/testing", "tools": { "allow": ["read", "bash"] } },
{ "id": "security-scanner", "workspace": "~/agents/security", "tools": { "allow": ["read", "exec"] } },
{ "id": "test-coverage", "workspace": "~/agents/testing", "tools": { "allow": ["read", "exec"] } },
{ "id": "docs-checker", "workspace": "~/agents/docs", "tools": { "allow": ["read"] } }
]
}

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@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ To disable bootstrap file creation entirely (for pre-seeded workspaces), set:
## Built-in tools
Core tools (read/bash/edit/write and related system tools) are always available. `TOOLS.md` does **not** control which tools exist; its guidance for how *you* want them used.
Core tools (read/exec/edit/write and related system tools) are always available. `TOOLS.md` does **not** control which tools exist; its guidance for how *you* want them used.
## Skills

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@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ Starting with v2026.1.6, each agent can have its own sandbox and tool restrictio
},
tools: {
allow: ["read"], // Only read tool
deny: ["bash", "write", "edit"], // Deny others
deny: ["exec", "write", "edit"], // Deny others
},
},
],
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ Starting with v2026.1.6, each agent can have its own sandbox and tool restrictio
- **Flexible policies**: Different permissions per agent
Note: `tools.elevated` is **global** and sender-based; it is not configurable per agent.
If you need per-agent boundaries, use `agents.list[].tools` to deny `bash`.
If you need per-agent boundaries, use `agents.list[].tools` to deny `exec`.
For group targeting, use `agents.list[].groupChat.mentionPatterns` so @mentions map cleanly to the intended agent.
See [Multi-Agent Sandbox & Tools](/multi-agent-sandbox-tools) for detailed examples.

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@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Restrict pruning to specific tools:
agent: {
contextPruning: {
mode: "adaptive",
tools: { allow: ["bash", "read"], deny: ["*image*"] }
tools: { allow: ["exec", "read"], deny: ["*image*"] }
}
}
}

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@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ The prompt is intentionally compact and uses fixed sections:
- **Clawdbot Self-Update**: how to run `config.apply` and `update.run`.
- **Workspace**: working directory (`agents.defaults.workspace`).
- **Workspace Files (injected)**: indicates bootstrap files are included below.
- **Sandbox** (when enabled): indicates sandboxed runtime, sandbox paths, and whether elevated bash is available.
- **Sandbox** (when enabled): indicates sandboxed runtime, sandbox paths, and whether elevated exec is available.
- **Time**: UTC default + the users local time (already converted).
- **Reply Tags**: optional reply tag syntax for supported providers.
- **Heartbeats**: heartbeat prompt and ack behavior.

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@@ -103,7 +103,11 @@
},
{
"source": "/bash",
"destination": "/tools/bash"
"destination": "/tools/exec"
},
{
"source": "/tools/bash",
"destination": "/tools/exec"
},
{
"source": "/bonjour",
@@ -696,7 +700,7 @@
"pages": [
"tools",
"plugin",
"tools/bash",
"tools/exec",
"tools/elevated",
"tools/browser",
"tools/browser-linux-troubleshooting",

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@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
---
summary: "Background bash execution and process management"
summary: "Background exec execution and process management"
read_when:
- Adding or modifying background bash behavior
- Debugging long-running bash tasks
- Adding or modifying background exec behavior
- Debugging long-running exec tasks
---
# Background Bash + Process Tool
# Background Exec + Process Tool
Clawdbot runs shell commands through the `bash` tool and keeps longrunning tasks in memory. The `process` tool manages those background sessions.
Clawdbot runs shell commands through the `exec` tool and keeps longrunning tasks in memory. The `process` tool manages those background sessions.
## bash tool
## exec tool
Key parameters:
- `command` (required)
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Behavior:
- Foreground runs return output directly.
- When backgrounded (explicit or timeout), the tool returns `status: "running"` + `sessionId` and a short tail.
- Output is kept in memory until the session is polled or cleared.
- If the `process` tool is disallowed, `bash` runs synchronously and ignores `yieldMs`/`background`.
- If the `process` tool is disallowed, `exec` runs synchronously and ignores `yieldMs`/`background`.
Environment overrides:
- `PI_BASH_YIELD_MS`: default yield (ms)
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ Environment overrides:
- `PI_BASH_JOB_TTL_MS`: TTL for finished sessions (ms, bounded to 1m3h)
Config (preferred):
- `tools.bash.backgroundMs` (default 10000)
- `tools.bash.timeoutSec` (default 1800)
- `tools.bash.cleanupMs` (default 1800000)
- `tools.exec.backgroundMs` (default 10000)
- `tools.exec.timeoutSec` (default 1800)
- `tools.exec.cleanupMs` (default 1800000)
## process tool
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Notes:
Run a long task and poll later:
```json
{"tool": "bash", "command": "sleep 5 && echo done", "yieldMs": 1000}
{"tool": "exec", "command": "sleep 5 && echo done", "yieldMs": 1000}
```
```json
{"tool": "process", "action": "poll", "sessionId": "<id>"}
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ Run a long task and poll later:
Start immediately in background:
```json
{"tool": "bash", "command": "npm run build", "background": true}
{"tool": "exec", "command": "npm run build", "background": true}
```
Send stdin:

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@@ -259,9 +259,9 @@ Save to `~/.clawdbot/clawdbot.json` and you can DM the bot from that number.
},
tools: {
allow: ["bash", "process", "read", "write", "edit"],
allow: ["exec", "process", "read", "write", "edit"],
deny: ["browser", "canvas"],
bash: {
exec: {
backgroundMs: 10000,
timeoutSec: 1800,
cleanupMs: 1800000

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@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ Read-only tools + read-only workspace:
},
tools: {
allow: ["read", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "sessions_send", "sessions_spawn", "session_status"],
deny: ["write", "edit", "bash", "process", "browser"]
deny: ["write", "edit", "exec", "process", "browser"]
}
}
]
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ No filesystem access (messaging/session tools enabled):
},
tools: {
allow: ["sessions_list", "sessions_history", "sessions_send", "sessions_spawn", "session_status", "whatsapp", "telegram", "slack", "discord", "gateway"],
deny: ["read", "write", "edit", "bash", "process", "browser", "canvas", "nodes", "cron", "gateway", "image"]
deny: ["read", "write", "edit", "exec", "process", "browser", "canvas", "nodes", "cron", "gateway", "image"]
}
}
]
@@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ Example:
maxConcurrent: 1,
archiveAfterMinutes: 60
},
bash: {
exec: {
backgroundMs: 10000,
timeoutSec: 1800,
cleanupMs: 1800000
@@ -1427,10 +1427,11 @@ Z.AI models are available as `zai/<model>` (e.g. `zai/glm-4.7`) and require
Heartbeats run full agent turns. Shorter intervals burn more tokens; be mindful
of `every`, keep `HEARTBEAT.md` tiny, and/or choose a cheaper `model`.
`tools.bash` configures background bash defaults:
`tools.exec` configures background exec defaults:
- `backgroundMs`: time before auto-background (ms, default 10000)
- `timeoutSec`: auto-kill after this runtime (seconds, default 1800)
- `cleanupMs`: how long to keep finished sessions in memory (ms, default 1800000)
Legacy: `tools.bash` is still accepted as an alias.
`agents.defaults.subagents` configures sub-agent defaults:
- `maxConcurrent`: max concurrent sub-agent runs (default 1)
@@ -1447,7 +1448,7 @@ Example (disable browser/canvas everywhere):
}
```
`tools.elevated` controls elevated (host) bash access:
`tools.elevated` controls elevated (host) exec access:
- `enabled`: allow elevated mode (default true)
- `allowFrom`: per-provider allowlists (empty = disabled)
- `whatsapp`: E.164 numbers
@@ -1491,8 +1492,8 @@ Per-agent override (further restrict):
Notes:
- `tools.elevated` is the global baseline. `agents.list[].tools.elevated` can only further restrict (both must allow).
- `/elevated on|off` stores state per session key; inline directives apply to a single message.
- Elevated `bash` runs on the host and bypasses sandboxing.
- Tool policy still applies; if `bash` is denied, elevated cannot be used.
- Elevated `exec` runs on the host and bypasses sandboxing.
- Tool policy still applies; if `exec` is denied, elevated cannot be used.
`agents.defaults.maxConcurrent` sets the maximum number of embedded agent runs that can
execute in parallel across sessions. Each session is still serialized (one run
@@ -1513,7 +1514,7 @@ Defaults (if enabled):
- `"ro"`: keep the sandbox workspace at `/workspace`, and mount the agent workspace read-only at `/agent` (disables `write`/`edit`)
- `"rw"`: mount the agent workspace read/write at `/workspace`
- auto-prune: idle > 24h OR age > 7d
- tool policy: allow only `bash`, `process`, `read`, `write`, `edit`, `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`, `sessions_spawn`, `session_status` (deny wins)
- tool policy: allow only `exec`, `process`, `read`, `write`, `edit`, `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`, `sessions_spawn`, `session_status` (deny wins)
- configure via `tools.sandbox.tools`, override per-agent via `agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools`
- optional sandboxed browser (Chromium + CDP, noVNC observer)
- hardening knobs: `network`, `user`, `pidsLimit`, `memory`, `cpus`, `ulimits`, `seccompProfile`, `apparmorProfile`
@@ -1584,7 +1585,7 @@ Legacy: `perSession` is still supported (`true` → `scope: "session"`,
tools: {
sandbox: {
tools: {
allow: ["bash", "process", "read", "write", "edit", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "sessions_send", "sessions_spawn", "session_status"],
allow: ["exec", "process", "read", "write", "edit", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "sessions_send", "sessions_spawn", "session_status"],
deny: ["browser", "canvas", "nodes", "cron", "discord", "gateway"]
}
}

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@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ Current migrations:
- `routing.agentToAgent``tools.agentToAgent`
- `routing.transcribeAudio``tools.audio.transcription`
- `identity``agents.list[].identity`
- `agent.*``agents.defaults` + `tools.*` (tools/elevated/bash/sandbox/subagents)
- `agent.*``agents.defaults` + `tools.*` (tools/elevated/exec/sandbox/subagents)
- `agent.model`/`allowedModels`/`modelAliases`/`modelFallbacks`/`imageModelFallbacks`
`agents.defaults.models` + `agents.defaults.model.primary/fallbacks` + `agents.defaults.imageModel.primary/fallbacks`

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@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ You can tune console verbosity independently via:
## Tool summary redaction
Verbose tool summaries (e.g. `🛠️ bash: ...`) can mask sensitive tokens before they hit the
Verbose tool summaries (e.g. `🛠️ exec: ...`) can mask sensitive tokens before they hit the
console stream. This is **tools-only** and does not alter file logs.
- `logging.redactSensitive`: `off` | `tools` (default: `tools`)

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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
title: Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated
summary: "Why a tool is blocked: sandbox runtime, tool allow/deny policy, and elevated bash gates"
summary: "Why a tool is blocked: sandbox runtime, tool allow/deny policy, and elevated exec gates"
read_when: "You hit 'sandbox jail' or see a tool/elevated refusal and want the exact config key to change."
status: active
---
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ Clawdbot has three related (but different) controls:
1. **Sandbox** (`agents.defaults.sandbox.*` / `agents.list[].sandbox.*`) decides **where tools run** (Docker vs host).
2. **Tool policy** (`tools.*`, `tools.sandbox.tools.*`, `agents.list[].tools.*`) decides **which tools are available/allowed**.
3. **Elevated** (`tools.elevated.*`, `agents.list[].tools.elevated.*`) is a **bash-only escape hatch** to run on the host when youre sandboxed.
3. **Elevated** (`tools.elevated.*`, `agents.list[].tools.elevated.*`) is an **exec-only escape hatch** to run on the host when youre sandboxed.
## Quick debug
@@ -49,10 +49,10 @@ Rules of thumb:
- `deny` always wins.
- If `allow` is non-empty, everything else is treated as blocked.
## Elevated: bash-only “run on host”
## Elevated: exec-only “run on host”
Elevated does **not** grant extra tools; it only affects `bash`.
- If youre sandboxed, `/elevated on` (or `bash` with `elevated: true`) runs on the host.
Elevated does **not** grant extra tools; it only affects `exec`.
- If youre sandboxed, `/elevated on` (or `exec` with `elevated: true`) runs on the host.
- If youre already running direct, elevated is effectively a no-op (still gated).
Gates:
@@ -74,4 +74,3 @@ Fix-it keys (pick one):
### “I thought this was main, why is it sandboxed?”
In `"non-main"` mode, group/channel keys are *not* main. Use the main session key (shown by `sandbox explain`) or switch mode to `"off"`.

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@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ This is not a perfect security boundary, but it materially limits filesystem
and process access when the model does something dumb.
## What gets sandboxed
- Tool execution (`bash`, `read`, `write`, `edit`, `process`, etc.).
- Tool execution (`exec`, `read`, `write`, `edit`, `process`, etc.).
- Optional sandboxed browser (`agents.defaults.sandbox.browser`).
- By default, the sandbox browser auto-starts (ensures CDP is reachable) when the browser tool needs it.
Configure via `agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.autoStart` and `agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.autoStartTimeoutMs`.
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ and process access when the model does something dumb.
Not sandboxed:
- The Gateway process itself.
- Any tool explicitly allowed to run on the host (e.g. `tools.elevated`).
- **Elevated bash runs on the host and bypasses sandboxing.**
- **Elevated exec runs on the host and bypasses sandboxing.**
- If sandboxing is off, `tools.elevated` does not change execution (already on host). See [Elevated Mode](/tools/elevated).
## Modes
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Docker installs and the containerized gateway live here:
Tool allow/deny policies still apply before sandbox rules. If a tool is denied
globally or per-agent, sandboxing doesnt bring it back.
`tools.elevated` is an explicit escape hatch that runs `bash` on the host.
`tools.elevated` is an explicit escape hatch that runs `exec` on the host.
Debugging:
- Use `clawdbot sandbox explain` to inspect effective sandbox mode, tool policy, and fix-it config keys.

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@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ Consider running your AI on a separate phone number from your personal one:
You can already build a read-only profile by combining:
- `agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess: "ro"` (or `"none"` for no workspace access)
- tool allow/deny lists that block `write`, `edit`, `bash`, `process`, etc.
- tool allow/deny lists that block `write`, `edit`, `exec`, `process`, etc.
We may add a single `readOnlyMode` flag later to simplify this configuration.
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ Also consider agent workspace access inside the sandbox:
- `agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess: "ro"` mounts the agent workspace read-only at `/agent` (disables `write`/`edit`)
- `agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess: "rw"` mounts the agent workspace read/write at `/workspace`
Important: `tools.elevated` is the global baseline escape hatch that runs bash on the host. Keep `tools.elevated.allowFrom` tight and dont enable it for strangers. You can further restrict elevated per agent via `agents.list[].tools.elevated`. See [Elevated Mode](/tools/elevated).
Important: `tools.elevated` is the global baseline escape hatch that runs exec on the host. Keep `tools.elevated.allowFrom` tight and dont enable it for strangers. You can further restrict elevated per agent via `agents.list[].tools.elevated`. See [Elevated Mode](/tools/elevated).
## Browser control risks
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ Common use cases:
},
tools: {
allow: ["read"],
deny: ["write", "edit", "bash", "process", "browser"]
deny: ["write", "edit", "exec", "process", "browser"]
}
}
]
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ Common use cases:
},
tools: {
allow: ["sessions_list", "sessions_history", "sessions_send", "sessions_spawn", "session_status", "whatsapp", "telegram", "slack", "discord", "gateway"],
deny: ["read", "write", "edit", "bash", "process", "browser", "canvas", "nodes", "cron", "gateway", "image"]
deny: ["read", "write", "edit", "exec", "process", "browser", "canvas", "nodes", "cron", "gateway", "image"]
}
}
]

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@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ precedence, and troubleshooting.
- `"rw"` mounts the agent workspace read/write at `/workspace`
- Auto-prune: idle > 24h OR age > 7d
- Network: `none` by default (explicitly opt-in if you need egress)
- Default allow: `bash`, `process`, `read`, `write`, `edit`, `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`, `sessions_spawn`, `session_status`
- Default allow: `exec`, `process`, `read`, `write`, `edit`, `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`, `sessions_spawn`, `session_status`
- Default deny: `browser`, `canvas`, `nodes`, `cron`, `discord`, `gateway`
### Enable sandboxing
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ precedence, and troubleshooting.
tools: {
sandbox: {
tools: {
allow: ["bash", "process", "read", "write", "edit", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "sessions_send", "sessions_spawn", "session_status"],
allow: ["exec", "process", "read", "write", "edit", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "sessions_send", "sessions_spawn", "session_status"],
deny: ["browser", "canvas", "nodes", "cron", "discord", "gateway"]
}
}
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ Example:
### Security notes
- Hard wall only applies to **tools** (bash/read/write/edit).
- Hard wall only applies to **tools** (exec/read/write/edit).
- Host-only tools like browser/camera/canvas are blocked by default.
- Allowing `browser` in sandbox **breaks isolation** (browser runs on host).

View File

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ For debugging “why is this blocked?”, see [Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevate
},
"tools": {
"allow": ["read"],
"deny": ["bash", "write", "edit", "process", "browser"]
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "process", "browser"]
}
}
]
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ For debugging “why is this blocked?”, see [Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevate
"workspaceRoot": "/tmp/work-sandboxes"
},
"tools": {
"allow": ["read", "write", "bash"],
"allow": ["read", "write", "exec"],
"deny": ["browser", "gateway", "discord"]
}
}
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ For debugging “why is this blocked?”, see [Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevate
},
"tools": {
"allow": ["read"],
"deny": ["bash", "write", "edit"]
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit"]
}
}
]
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ If `agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools` is set, it replaces `tools.sandbox.tools`
`tools.elevated` is the global baseline (sender-based allowlist). `agents.list[].tools.elevated` can further restrict elevated for specific agents (both must allow).
Mitigation patterns:
- Deny `bash` for untrusted agents (`agents.list[].tools.deny: ["bash"]`)
- Deny `exec` for untrusted agents (`agents.list[].tools.deny: ["exec"]`)
- Avoid allowlisting senders that route to restricted agents
- Disable elevated globally (`tools.elevated.enabled: false`) if you only want sandboxed execution
- Disable elevated per agent (`agents.list[].tools.elevated.enabled: false`) for sensitive profiles
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ Mitigation patterns:
"tools": {
"sandbox": {
"tools": {
"allow": ["read", "write", "bash"],
"allow": ["read", "write", "exec"],
"deny": []
}
}
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ Legacy `agent.*` configs are migrated by `clawdbot doctor`; prefer `agents.defau
{
"tools": {
"allow": ["read"],
"deny": ["bash", "write", "edit", "process"]
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "process"]
}
}
```
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ Legacy `agent.*` configs are migrated by `clawdbot doctor`; prefer `agents.defau
```json
{
"tools": {
"allow": ["read", "bash", "process"],
"allow": ["read", "exec", "process"],
"deny": ["write", "edit", "browser", "gateway"]
}
}
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ Legacy `agent.*` configs are migrated by `clawdbot doctor`; prefer `agents.defau
{
"tools": {
"allow": ["sessions_list", "sessions_send", "sessions_history", "session_status"],
"deny": ["bash", "write", "edit", "read", "browser"]
"deny": ["exec", "write", "edit", "read", "browser"]
}
}
```
@@ -276,12 +276,12 @@ sandbox, set `agents.list[].sandbox.mode: "off"`.
After configuring multi-agent sandbox and tools:
1. **Check agent resolution:**
```bash
```exec
clawdbot agents list --bindings
```
2. **Verify sandbox containers:**
```bash
```exec
docker ps --filter "label=clawdbot.sandbox=1"
```
@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ After configuring multi-agent sandbox and tools:
- Verify the agent cannot use denied tools
4. **Monitor logs:**
```bash
```exec
tail -f "${CLAWDBOT_STATE_DIR:-$HOME/.clawdbot}/logs/gateway.log" | grep -E "routing|sandbox|tools"
```

View File

@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ read_when:
- `overridden(ActivityKind)` (debug override)
### ActivityKind → glyph
- `bash` → 💻
- `exec` → 💻
- `read` → 📄
- `write` → ✍️
- `edit` → 📝
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ read_when:
## Status row text (menu)
- While work is active: `<Session role> · <activity label>`
- Examples: `Main · bash: pnpm test`, `Other · read: apps/macos/Sources/Clawdbot/AppState.swift`.
- Examples: `Main · exec: pnpm test`, `Other · read: apps/macos/Sources/Clawdbot/AppState.swift`.
- When idle: falls back to the health summary.
## Event ingestion
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ read_when:
- `stream: "job"` with `data.state` for start/stop.
- `stream: "tool"` with `data.phase`, `name`, optional `meta`/`args`.
- Labels:
- `bash`: first line of `args.command`.
- `exec`: first line of `args.command`.
- `read`/`write`: shortened path.
- `edit`: path plus inferred change kind from `meta`/diff counts.
- fallback: tool name.

View File

@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ exit
These are abort triggers (not slash commands).
For background processes (from the bash tool), you can ask the agent to run:
For background processes (from the exec tool), you can ask the agent to run:
```
process action:kill sessionId:XXX

View File

@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ Use these hubs to discover every page, including deep dives and reference docs t
- [Tools surface](/tools)
- [CLI reference](/cli)
- [Bash tool](/tools/bash)
- [Exec tool](/tools/exec)
- [Elevated mode](/tools/elevated)
- [Cron jobs](/automation/cron-jobs)
- [Thinking + verbose](/tools/thinking)

View File

@@ -120,11 +120,11 @@ Live tests are split into two layers so we can isolate failures:
- Iterate models-with-keys and assert:
- “meaningful” response (no tools)
- a real tool invocation works (read probe)
- optional extra tool probes (bash+read probe)
- optional extra tool probes (exec+read probe)
- OpenAI regression paths (tool-call-only → follow-up) keep working
- Probe details (so you can explain failures quickly):
- `read` probe: the test writes a nonce file in the workspace and asks the agent to `read` it and echo the nonce back.
- `bash+read` probe: the test asks the agent to `bash`-write a nonce into a temp file, then `read` it back.
- `exec+read` probe: the test asks the agent to `exec`-write a nonce into a temp file, then `read` it back.
- image probe: the test attaches a generated PNG (cat + randomized code) and expects the model to return `cat <CODE>`.
- Implementation reference: `src/gateway/gateway-models.profiles.live.test.ts` and `src/gateway/live-image-probe.ts`.
- How to enable:
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ Live tests are split into two layers so we can isolate failures:
- How to select providers (avoid “OpenRouter everything”):
- `CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_PROVIDERS="google,google-antigravity,google-gemini-cli,openai,anthropic,zai,minimax"` (comma allowlist)
- Optional tool-calling stress:
- `CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_TOOL_PROBE=1` enables an extra “bash writes file → read reads it back → echo nonce” check.
- `CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_TOOL_PROBE=1` enables an extra “exec writes file → read reads it back → echo nonce” check.
- This is specifically meant to catch tool-calling compatibility issues across providers (formatting, history replay, tool_result pairing, etc.).
- Optional image send smoke:
- `CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_IMAGE_PROBE=1` sends a real image attachment through the gateway agent pipeline (multimodal message) and asserts the model can read back a per-run code from the image.
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ Narrow, explicit allowlists are fastest and least flaky:
- Single model, gateway smoke:
- `LIVE=1 CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY=1 CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_ALL_MODELS=1 CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_MODELS="openai/gpt-5.2" pnpm test:live src/gateway/gateway-models.profiles.live.test.ts`
- Tool calling across several providers (bash + read probe):
- Tool calling across several providers (exec + read probe):
- `LIVE=1 CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY=1 CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_ALL_MODELS=1 CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_TOOL_PROBE=1 CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_MODELS="openai/gpt-5.2,anthropic/claude-opus-4-5,google/gemini-3-flash,zai/glm-4.7,minimax/minimax-m2.1" pnpm test:live src/gateway/gateway-models.profiles.live.test.ts`
- Google focus (Gemini API key + Antigravity):
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ This is the “common models” run we expect to keep working:
Run gateway smoke with tools + image:
`LIVE=1 CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY=1 CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_TOOL_PROBE=1 CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_IMAGE_PROBE=1 CLAWDBOT_LIVE_GATEWAY_MODELS="openai/gpt-5.2,openai-codex/gpt-5.2,anthropic/claude-opus-4-5,google/gemini-3-pro,google/gemini-3-flash,google-antigravity/claude-opus-4-5-thinking,google-antigravity/gemini-3-flash,zai/glm-4.7,minimax/minimax-m2.1" pnpm test:live src/gateway/gateway-models.profiles.live.test.ts`
### Baseline: tool calling (Read + optional Bash)
### Baseline: tool calling (Read + optional Exec)
Pick at least one per provider family:
- OpenAI: `openai/gpt-5.2` (or `openai/gpt-5-mini`)

View File

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
---
summary: "Elevated bash mode and /elevated directives"
summary: "Elevated exec mode and /elevated directives"
read_when:
- Adjusting elevated mode defaults, allowlists, or slash command behavior
---
# Elevated Mode (/elevated directives)
## What it does
- Elevated mode allows the bash tool to run with elevated privileges when the feature is available and the sender is approved.
- Elevated mode allows the exec tool to run with elevated privileges when the feature is available and the sender is approved.
- **Optional for sandboxed agents**: elevated only changes behavior when the agent is running in a sandbox. If the agent already runs unsandboxed, elevated is effectively a no-op.
- Directive forms: `/elevated on`, `/elevated off`, `/elev on`, `/elev off`.
- Only `on|off` are accepted; anything else returns a hint and does not change state.
@@ -16,16 +16,16 @@ read_when:
- **Per-session state**: `/elevated on|off` sets the elevated level for the current session key.
- **Inline directive**: `/elevated on` inside a message applies to that message only.
- **Groups**: In group chats, elevated directives are only honored when the agent is mentioned. Command-only messages that bypass mention requirements are treated as mentioned.
- **Host execution**: elevated runs `bash` on the host (bypasses sandbox).
- **Unsandboxed agents**: when there is no sandbox to bypass, elevated does not change where `bash` runs.
- **Tool policy still applies**: if `bash` is denied by tool policy, elevated cannot be used.
- **Host execution**: elevated runs `exec` on the host (bypasses sandbox).
- **Unsandboxed agents**: when there is no sandbox to bypass, elevated does not change where `exec` runs.
- **Tool policy still applies**: if `exec` is denied by tool policy, elevated cannot be used.
Note:
- Sandbox on: `/elevated on` runs that `bash` command on the host.
- Sandbox on: `/elevated on` runs that `exec` command on the host.
- Sandbox off: `/elevated on` does not change execution (already on host).
## When elevated matters
- Only impacts `bash` when the agent is running sandboxed (it drops the sandbox for that command).
- Only impacts `exec` when the agent is running sandboxed (it drops the sandbox for that command).
- For unsandboxed agents, elevated does not change execution; it only affects gating, logging, and status.
## Resolution order
@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ Note:
- All gates must pass; otherwise elevated is treated as unavailable.
## Logging + status
- Elevated bash calls are logged at info level.
- Elevated exec calls are logged at info level.
- Session status includes elevated mode (e.g. `elevated=on`).

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
---
summary: "Bash tool usage, stdin modes, and TTY support"
summary: "Exec tool usage, stdin modes, and TTY support"
read_when:
- Using or modifying the bash tool
- Using or modifying the exec tool
- Debugging stdin or TTY behavior
---
# Bash tool
# Exec tool
Run shell commands in the workspace. Supports foreground + background execution via `process`.
If `process` is disallowed, `bash` runs synchronously and ignores `yieldMs`/`background`.
If `process` is disallowed, `exec` runs synchronously and ignores `yieldMs`/`background`.
Background sessions are scoped per agent; `process` only sees sessions from the same agent.
## Parameters
@@ -19,17 +19,17 @@ Background sessions are scoped per agent; `process` only sees sessions from the
- `timeout` (seconds, default 1800): kill on expiry
- `elevated` (bool): run on host if elevated mode is enabled/allowed (only changes behavior when the agent is sandboxed)
- Need a real TTY? Use the tmux skill.
Note: `elevated` is ignored when sandboxing is off (bash already runs on the host).
Note: `elevated` is ignored when sandboxing is off (exec already runs on the host).
## Examples
Foreground:
```json
{"tool":"bash","command":"ls -la"}
{"tool":"exec","command":"ls -la"}
```
Background + poll:
```json
{"tool":"bash","command":"npm run build","yieldMs":1000}
{"tool":"exec","command":"npm run build","yieldMs":1000}
{"tool":"process","action":"poll","sessionId":"<id>"}
```

View File

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ alongside tools (for example, the voice-call plugin).
## Tool inventory
### `bash`
### `exec`
Run shell commands in the workspace.
Core parameters:
@@ -45,12 +45,12 @@ Core parameters:
Notes:
- Returns `status: "running"` with a `sessionId` when backgrounded.
- Use `process` to poll/log/write/kill/clear background sessions.
- If `process` is disallowed, `bash` runs synchronously and ignores `yieldMs`/`background`.
- If `process` is disallowed, `exec` runs synchronously and ignores `yieldMs`/`background`.
- `elevated` is gated by `tools.elevated` plus any `agents.list[].tools.elevated` override (both must allow) and runs on the host.
- `elevated` only changes behavior when the agent is sandboxed (otherwise its a no-op).
### `process`
Manage background bash sessions.
Manage background exec sessions.
Core actions:
- `list`, `poll`, `log`, `write`, `kill`, `clear`, `remove`

View File

@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ Override via config:
// deny wins
deny: ["gateway", "cron"],
// if allow is set, it becomes allow-only (deny still wins)
// allow: ["read", "bash", "process"]
// allow: ["read", "exec", "process"]
}
}
}

View File

@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ function walk(node, parent) {
if (name) seen.add(name);
}
if (typeof obj.name === "string" && typeof obj.input === "object" && obj.input) {
// Many tool-use blocks look like { type: "...", name: "bash", input: {...} }
// Many tool-use blocks look like { type: "...", name: "exec", input: {...} }
// but some transcripts omit/rename type.
seen.add(obj.name);
}
@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ run_profile() {
TURN4_JSON="/tmp/agent-${profile}-4.json"
run_agent_turn "$profile" "$SESSION_ID" \
"Use the read tool (not bash) to read proof.txt. Reply with the exact contents only (no extra whitespace)." \
"Use the read tool (not exec) to read proof.txt. Reply with the exact contents only (no extra whitespace)." \
"$TURN1_JSON"
assert_agent_json_has_text "$TURN1_JSON"
assert_agent_json_ok "$TURN1_JSON" "$agent_model_provider"
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ run_profile() {
fi
local prompt2
prompt2=$'Use the write tool (not bash) to write exactly this string into copy.txt:\n'"${reply1}"$'\nThen use the read tool (not bash) to read copy.txt and reply with the exact contents only (no extra whitespace).'
prompt2=$'Use the write tool (not exec) to write exactly this string into copy.txt:\n'"${reply1}"$'\nThen use the read tool (not exec) to read copy.txt and reply with the exact contents only (no extra whitespace).'
run_agent_turn "$profile" "$SESSION_ID" "$prompt2" "$TURN2_JSON"
assert_agent_json_has_text "$TURN2_JSON"
assert_agent_json_ok "$TURN2_JSON" "$agent_model_provider"
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ run_profile() {
fi
local prompt3
prompt3=$'Use the bash tool to run: cat /etc/hostname\nThen use the write tool to write the exact stdout (trim trailing newline) into hostname.txt. Reply with the hostname only.'
prompt3=$'Use the exec tool to run: cat /etc/hostname\nThen use the write tool to write the exact stdout (trim trailing newline) into hostname.txt. Reply with the hostname only.'
run_agent_turn "$profile" "$SESSION_ID" "$prompt3" "$TURN3_JSON"
assert_agent_json_has_text "$TURN3_JSON"
assert_agent_json_ok "$TURN3_JSON" "$agent_model_provider"
@@ -468,7 +468,7 @@ run_profile() {
ls -la "/root/.clawdbot-${profile}/agents/main/sessions" >&2 || true
exit 1
fi
assert_session_used_tools "$SESSION_JSONL" read write bash image
assert_session_used_tools "$SESSION_JSONL" read write exec image
cleanup_profile
trap - EXIT

View File

@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ async function main() {
console.log("== Run 1: create tool history (primary only)");
const toolPrompt =
"Use the bash tool to create a file named zai-fallback-tool.txt with the content tool-ok. " +
"Use the exec tool to create a file named zai-fallback-tool.txt with the content tool-ok. " +
"Then use the read tool to display the file contents. Reply with just the file contents.";
const run1 = await runCommand(
"run1",

View File

@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🧵","os":["darwin","linux"],"requires":{"bins"
# tmux Skill (Clawdbot)
Use tmux only when you need an interactive TTY. Prefer bash background mode for long-running, non-interactive tasks.
Use tmux only when you need an interactive TTY. Prefer exec background mode for long-running, non-interactive tasks.
## Quickstart (isolated socket, bash tool)
## Quickstart (isolated socket, exec tool)
```bash
SOCKET_DIR="${CLAWDBOT_TMUX_SOCKET_DIR:-${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/clawdbot-tmux-sockets}"

View File

@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ describe("resolveAgentConfig", () => {
workspace: "~/clawd-restricted",
tools: {
allow: ["read"],
deny: ["bash", "write", "edit"],
deny: ["exec", "write", "edit"],
elevated: {
enabled: false,
allowFrom: { whatsapp: ["+15555550123"] },
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ describe("resolveAgentConfig", () => {
const result = resolveAgentConfig(cfg, "restricted");
expect(result?.tools).toEqual({
allow: ["read"],
deny: ["bash", "write", "edit"],
deny: ["exec", "write", "edit"],
elevated: {
enabled: false,
allowFrom: { whatsapp: ["+15555550123"] },
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ describe("resolveAgentConfig", () => {
},
tools: {
allow: ["read"],
deny: ["bash"],
deny: ["exec"],
},
},
],

View File

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it } from "vitest";
import { resetProcessRegistryForTests } from "./bash-process-registry.js";
import {
bashTool,
createBashTool,
createExecTool,
createProcessTool,
execTool,
processTool,
} from "./bash-tools.js";
import { sanitizeBinaryOutput } from "./shell-utils.js";
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ beforeEach(() => {
resetProcessRegistryForTests();
});
describe("bash tool backgrounding", () => {
describe("exec tool backgrounding", () => {
const originalShell = process.env.SHELL;
beforeEach(() => {
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ describe("bash tool backgrounding", () => {
it(
"backgrounds after yield and can be polled",
async () => {
const result = await bashTool.execute("call1", {
const result = await execTool.execute("call1", {
command: joinCommands([yieldDelayCmd, "echo done"]),
yieldMs: 10,
});
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ describe("bash tool backgrounding", () => {
);
it("supports explicit background", async () => {
const result = await bashTool.execute("call1", {
const result = await execTool.execute("call1", {
command: echoAfterDelay("later"),
background: true,
});
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ describe("bash tool backgrounding", () => {
});
it("derives a session name from the command", async () => {
const result = await bashTool.execute("call1", {
const result = await execTool.execute("call1", {
command: "echo hello",
background: true,
});
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ describe("bash tool backgrounding", () => {
});
it("uses default timeout when timeout is omitted", async () => {
const customBash = createBashTool({ timeoutSec: 1, backgroundMs: 10 });
const customBash = createExecTool({ timeoutSec: 1, backgroundMs: 10 });
const customProcess = createProcessTool();
const result = await customBash.execute("call1", {
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ describe("bash tool backgrounding", () => {
});
it("rejects elevated requests when not allowed", async () => {
const customBash = createBashTool({
const customBash = createExecTool({
elevated: { enabled: true, allowed: false, defaultLevel: "off" },
});
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ describe("bash tool backgrounding", () => {
});
it("does not default to elevated when not allowed", async () => {
const customBash = createBashTool({
const customBash = createExecTool({
elevated: { enabled: true, allowed: false, defaultLevel: "on" },
backgroundMs: 1000,
timeoutSec: 5,
@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ describe("bash tool backgrounding", () => {
});
it("logs line-based slices and defaults to last lines", async () => {
const result = await bashTool.execute("call1", {
const result = await execTool.execute("call1", {
command: echoLines(["one", "two", "three"]),
background: true,
});
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ describe("bash tool backgrounding", () => {
});
it("supports line offsets for log slices", async () => {
const result = await bashTool.execute("call1", {
const result = await execTool.execute("call1", {
command: echoLines(["alpha", "beta", "gamma"]),
background: true,
});
@@ -221,9 +221,9 @@ describe("bash tool backgrounding", () => {
});
it("scopes process sessions by scopeKey", async () => {
const bashA = createBashTool({ backgroundMs: 10, scopeKey: "agent:alpha" });
const bashA = createExecTool({ backgroundMs: 10, scopeKey: "agent:alpha" });
const processA = createProcessTool({ scopeKey: "agent:alpha" });
const bashB = createBashTool({ backgroundMs: 10, scopeKey: "agent:beta" });
const bashB = createExecTool({ backgroundMs: 10, scopeKey: "agent:beta" });
const processB = createProcessTool({ scopeKey: "agent:beta" });
const resultA = await bashA.execute("call1", {

View File

@@ -54,11 +54,11 @@ const _stringEnum = <T extends readonly string[]>(
...options,
});
export type BashToolDefaults = {
export type ExecToolDefaults = {
backgroundMs?: number;
timeoutSec?: number;
sandbox?: BashSandboxConfig;
elevated?: BashElevatedDefaults;
elevated?: ExecElevatedDefaults;
allowBackground?: boolean;
scopeKey?: string;
cwd?: string;
@@ -76,14 +76,14 @@ export type BashSandboxConfig = {
env?: Record<string, string>;
};
export type BashElevatedDefaults = {
export type ExecElevatedDefaults = {
enabled: boolean;
allowed: boolean;
defaultLevel: "on" | "off";
};
const bashSchema = Type.Object({
command: Type.String({ description: "Bash command to execute" }),
const execSchema = Type.Object({
command: Type.String({ description: "Shell command to execute" }),
workdir: Type.Optional(
Type.String({ description: "Working directory (defaults to cwd)" }),
),
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ const bashSchema = Type.Object({
),
});
export type BashToolDetails =
export type ExecToolDetails =
| {
status: "running";
sessionId: string;
@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ export type BashToolDetails =
cwd?: string;
};
export function createBashTool(
defaults?: BashToolDefaults,
export function createExecTool(
defaults?: ExecToolDefaults,
// biome-ignore lint/suspicious/noExplicitAny: TypeBox schema type from pi-agent-core uses a different module instance.
): AgentTool<any, BashToolDetails> {
): AgentTool<any, ExecToolDetails> {
const defaultBackgroundMs = clampNumber(
defaults?.backgroundMs ?? readEnvInt("PI_BASH_YIELD_MS"),
10_000,
@@ -142,11 +142,11 @@ export function createBashTool(
: 1800;
return {
name: "bash",
label: "bash",
name: "exec",
label: "exec",
description:
"Execute bash with background continuation. Use yieldMs/background to continue later via process tool. For real TTY mode, use the tmux skill.",
parameters: bashSchema,
"Execute shell commands with background continuation. Use yieldMs/background to continue later via process tool. For real TTY mode, use the tmux skill.",
parameters: execSchema,
execute: async (_toolCallId, args, signal, onUpdate) => {
const params = args as {
command: string;
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ export function createBashTool(
);
}
logInfo(
`bash: elevated command (${sessionId.slice(0, 8)}) ${truncateMiddle(
`exec: elevated command (${sessionId.slice(0, 8)}) ${truncateMiddle(
params.command,
120,
)}`,
@@ -363,7 +363,7 @@ export function createBashTool(
}
});
return new Promise<AgentToolResult<BashToolDetails>>(
return new Promise<AgentToolResult<ExecToolDetails>>(
(resolve, reject) => {
const resolveRunning = () => {
settle(() =>
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ export function createBashTool(
};
}
export const bashTool = createBashTool();
export const execTool = createExecTool();
const processSchema = Type.Object({
action: Type.String({ description: "Process action" }),
@@ -509,7 +509,7 @@ export function createProcessTool(
return {
name: "process",
label: "process",
description: "Manage running bash sessions: list, poll, log, write, kill.",
description: "Manage running exec sessions: list, poll, log, write, kill.",
parameters: processSchema,
execute: async (_toolCallId, args) => {
const params = args as {

View File

@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ describe("sanitizeGoogleTurnOrdering", () => {
{
role: "assistant",
content: [
{ type: "toolCall", id: "call_1", name: "bash", arguments: {} },
{ type: "toolCall", id: "call_1", name: "exec", arguments: {} },
],
},
] satisfies AgentMessage[];
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ describe("sanitizeSessionMessagesImages", () => {
{
type: "toolCall",
id: "call_abc|item:456",
name: "bash",
name: "exec",
arguments: {},
},
],

View File

@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ describe("buildEmbeddedSandboxInfo", () => {
env: { LANG: "C.UTF-8" },
},
tools: {
allow: ["bash"],
allow: ["exec"],
deny: ["browser"],
},
browserAllowHostControl: true,
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ describe("buildEmbeddedSandboxInfo", () => {
env: { LANG: "C.UTF-8" },
},
tools: {
allow: ["bash"],
allow: ["exec"],
deny: ["browser"],
},
browserAllowHostControl: false,
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ function createStubTool(name: string): AgentTool {
describe("splitSdkTools", () => {
const tools = [
createStubTool("read"),
createStubTool("bash"),
createStubTool("exec"),
createStubTool("edit"),
createStubTool("write"),
createStubTool("browser"),
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ describe("splitSdkTools", () => {
expect(builtInTools).toEqual([]);
expect(customTools.map((tool) => tool.name)).toEqual([
"read",
"bash",
"exec",
"edit",
"write",
"browser",
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ describe("splitSdkTools", () => {
expect(builtInTools).toEqual([]);
expect(customTools.map((tool) => tool.name)).toEqual([
"read",
"bash",
"exec",
"edit",
"write",
"browser",
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ describe("applyGoogleTurnOrderingFix", () => {
{
role: "assistant",
content: [
{ type: "toolCall", id: "call_1", name: "bash", arguments: {} },
{ type: "toolCall", id: "call_1", name: "exec", arguments: {} },
],
},
] satisfies AgentMessage[];
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ describe("limitHistoryTurns", () => {
{ role: "user", content: [{ type: "text", text: "first" }] },
{
role: "assistant",
content: [{ type: "toolCall", id: "1", name: "bash", arguments: {} }],
content: [{ type: "toolCall", id: "1", name: "exec", arguments: {} }],
},
{ role: "user", content: [{ type: "text", text: "second" }] },
{ role: "assistant", content: [{ type: "text", text: "response" }] },

View File

@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ import {
markAuthProfileGood,
markAuthProfileUsed,
} from "./auth-profiles.js";
import type { BashElevatedDefaults } from "./bash-tools.js";
import type { ExecElevatedDefaults, ExecToolDefaults } from "./bash-tools.js";
import {
CONTEXT_WINDOW_HARD_MIN_TOKENS,
CONTEXT_WINDOW_WARN_BELOW_TOKENS,
@@ -768,11 +768,11 @@ function describeUnknownError(error: unknown): string {
export function buildEmbeddedSandboxInfo(
sandbox?: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof resolveSandboxContext>>,
bashElevated?: BashElevatedDefaults,
execElevated?: ExecElevatedDefaults,
): EmbeddedSandboxInfo | undefined {
if (!sandbox?.enabled) return undefined;
const elevatedAllowed = Boolean(
bashElevated?.enabled && bashElevated.allowed,
execElevated?.enabled && execElevated.allowed,
);
return {
enabled: true,
@@ -790,7 +790,7 @@ export function buildEmbeddedSandboxInfo(
? {
elevated: {
allowed: true,
defaultLevel: bashElevated?.defaultLevel ?? "off",
defaultLevel: execElevated?.defaultLevel ?? "off",
},
}
: {}),
@@ -949,6 +949,16 @@ function mapThinkingLevel(level?: ThinkLevel): ThinkingLevel {
return level;
}
function resolveExecToolDefaults(
config?: ClawdbotConfig,
): ExecToolDefaults | undefined {
const tools = config?.tools;
if (!tools) return undefined;
if (!tools.exec) return tools.bash;
if (!tools.bash) return tools.exec;
return { ...tools.bash, ...tools.exec };
}
function resolveModel(
provider: string,
modelId: string,
@@ -987,7 +997,7 @@ export async function compactEmbeddedPiSession(params: {
model?: string;
thinkLevel?: ThinkLevel;
reasoningLevel?: ReasoningLevel;
bashElevated?: BashElevatedDefaults;
bashElevated?: ExecElevatedDefaults;
customInstructions?: string;
lane?: string;
enqueue?: typeof enqueueCommand;
@@ -1087,8 +1097,8 @@ export async function compactEmbeddedPiSession(params: {
const contextFiles = buildBootstrapContextFiles(bootstrapFiles);
const runAbortController = new AbortController();
const tools = createClawdbotCodingTools({
bash: {
...params.config?.tools?.bash,
exec: {
...resolveExecToolDefaults(params.config),
elevated: params.bashElevated,
},
sandbox,
@@ -1289,7 +1299,7 @@ export async function runEmbeddedPiAgent(params: {
thinkLevel?: ThinkLevel;
verboseLevel?: VerboseLevel;
reasoningLevel?: ReasoningLevel;
bashElevated?: BashElevatedDefaults;
bashElevated?: ExecElevatedDefaults;
timeoutMs: number;
runId: string;
abortSignal?: AbortSignal;
@@ -1499,8 +1509,8 @@ export async function runEmbeddedPiAgent(params: {
// Tool schemas must be provider-compatible (OpenAI requires top-level `type: "object"`).
// `createClawdbotCodingTools()` normalizes schemas so the session can pass them through unchanged.
const tools = createClawdbotCodingTools({
bash: {
...params.config?.tools?.bash,
exec: {
...resolveExecToolDefaults(params.config),
elevated: params.bashElevated,
},
sandbox,

View File

@@ -94,28 +94,28 @@ describe("context-pruning", () => {
makeAssistant("a1"),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t1",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "x".repeat(20_000),
}),
makeUser("u2"),
makeAssistant("a2"),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t2",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "y".repeat(20_000),
}),
makeUser("u3"),
makeAssistant("a3"),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t3",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "z".repeat(20_000),
}),
makeUser("u4"),
makeAssistant("a4"),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t4",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "w".repeat(20_000),
}),
];
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ describe("context-pruning", () => {
makeUser("u1"),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t1",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "y".repeat(20_000),
}),
];
@@ -184,19 +184,19 @@ describe("context-pruning", () => {
makeAssistant("a1"),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t1",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "x".repeat(20_000),
}),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t2",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "y".repeat(20_000),
}),
makeUser("u2"),
makeAssistant("a2"),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t3",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "z".repeat(20_000),
}),
];
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ describe("context-pruning", () => {
makeAssistant("a1"),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t1",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "x".repeat(20_000),
}),
makeAssistant("a2"),
@@ -273,7 +273,7 @@ describe("context-pruning", () => {
makeAssistant("a1"),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t1",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "x".repeat(20_000),
}),
makeAssistant("a2"),
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ describe("context-pruning", () => {
makeUser("u1"),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t1",
toolName: "Bash",
toolName: "Exec",
text: "x".repeat(20_000),
}),
makeToolResult({
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ describe("context-pruning", () => {
softTrimRatio: 0.0,
hardClearRatio: 0.0,
minPrunableToolChars: 0,
tools: { allow: ["ba*"], deny: ["bash"] },
tools: { allow: ["ex*"], deny: ["exec"] },
hardClear: { enabled: true, placeholder: "[cleared]" },
softTrim: { maxChars: 10, headChars: 3, tailChars: 3 },
};
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ describe("context-pruning", () => {
} as unknown as ExtensionContext;
const next = pruneContextMessages({ messages, settings, ctx });
// Deny wins => bash is not pruned, even though allow matches.
// Deny wins => exec is not pruned, even though allow matches.
expect(toolText(findToolResult(next, "t1"))).toContain("x".repeat(20_000));
// allow is non-empty and browser is not allowed => never pruned.
expect(toolText(findToolResult(next, "t2"))).toContain("y".repeat(20_000));
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ describe("context-pruning", () => {
makeUser("u1"),
makeImageToolResult({
toolCallId: "t1",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "x".repeat(20_000),
}),
];
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ describe("context-pruning", () => {
{
role: "toolResult",
toolCallId: "t1",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
content: [
{ type: "text", text: "AAAAA" },
{ type: "text", text: "BBBBB" },
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ describe("context-pruning", () => {
makeUser("u1"),
makeToolResult({
toolCallId: "t1",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
text: "abcdefghij".repeat(1000),
}),
];

View File

@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
const toolNames = tools.map((t) => t.name);
expect(toolNames).toContain("read");
expect(toolNames).toContain("write");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("bash");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("exec");
});
it("should keep global tool policy when agent only sets tools.elevated", () => {
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
});
const toolNames = tools.map((t) => t.name);
expect(toolNames).toContain("bash");
expect(toolNames).toContain("exec");
expect(toolNames).toContain("read");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("write");
});
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
it("should apply agent-specific tool policy", () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
tools: {
allow: ["read", "write", "bash"],
allow: ["read", "write", "exec"],
deny: [],
},
agents: {
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
workspace: "~/clawd-restricted",
tools: {
allow: ["read"], // Agent override: only read
deny: ["bash", "write", "edit"],
deny: ["exec", "write", "edit"],
},
},
],
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
const toolNames = tools.map((t) => t.name);
expect(toolNames).toContain("read");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("bash");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("exec");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("write");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("edit");
});
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
workspace: "~/clawd-family",
tools: {
allow: ["read"],
deny: ["bash", "write", "edit", "process"],
deny: ["exec", "write", "edit", "process"],
},
},
],
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
agentDir: "/tmp/agent-main",
});
const mainToolNames = mainTools.map((t) => t.name);
expect(mainToolNames).toContain("bash");
expect(mainToolNames).toContain("exec");
expect(mainToolNames).toContain("write");
expect(mainToolNames).toContain("edit");
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
});
const familyToolNames = familyTools.map((t) => t.name);
expect(familyToolNames).toContain("read");
expect(familyToolNames).not.toContain("bash");
expect(familyToolNames).not.toContain("exec");
expect(familyToolNames).not.toContain("write");
expect(familyToolNames).not.toContain("edit");
});
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
id: "work",
workspace: "~/clawd-work",
tools: {
deny: ["bash", "process"], // Agent deny (override)
deny: ["exec", "process"], // Agent deny (override)
},
},
],
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
const toolNames = tools.map((t) => t.name);
// Agent policy overrides global: browser is allowed again
expect(toolNames).toContain("browser");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("bash");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("exec");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("process");
});
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
},
tools: {
allow: ["read"], // Agent further restricts to only read
deny: ["bash", "write"],
deny: ["exec", "write"],
},
},
],
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
tools: {
sandbox: {
tools: {
allow: ["read", "write", "bash"], // Sandbox allows these
allow: ["read", "write", "exec"], // Sandbox allows these
deny: [],
},
},
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
capDrop: [],
} satisfies SandboxDockerConfig,
tools: {
allow: ["read", "write", "bash"],
allow: ["read", "write", "exec"],
deny: [],
},
browserAllowHostControl: false,
@@ -246,14 +246,14 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
const toolNames = tools.map((t) => t.name);
// Agent policy should be applied first, then sandbox
// Agent allows only "read", sandbox allows ["read", "write", "bash"]
// Agent allows only "read", sandbox allows ["read", "write", "exec"]
// Result: only "read" (most restrictive wins)
expect(toolNames).toContain("read");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("bash");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("exec");
expect(toolNames).not.toContain("write");
});
it("should run bash synchronously when process is denied", async () => {
it("should run exec synchronously when process is denied", async () => {
const cfg: ClawdbotConfig = {
tools: {
deny: ["process"],
@@ -266,10 +266,10 @@ describe("Agent-specific tool filtering", () => {
workspaceDir: "/tmp/test-main",
agentDir: "/tmp/agent-main",
});
const bash = tools.find((tool) => tool.name === "bash");
expect(bash).toBeDefined();
const execTool = tools.find((tool) => tool.name === "exec");
expect(execTool).toBeDefined();
const result = await bash?.execute("call1", {
const result = await execTool?.execute("call1", {
command: "echo done",
yieldMs: 10,
});

View File

@@ -153,9 +153,9 @@ describe("createClawdbotCodingTools", () => {
}
});
it("includes bash and process tools", () => {
it("includes exec and process tools", () => {
const tools = createClawdbotCodingTools();
expect(tools.some((tool) => tool.name === "bash")).toBe(true);
expect(tools.some((tool) => tool.name === "exec")).toBe(true);
expect(tools.some((tool) => tool.name === "process")).toBe(true);
});
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ describe("createClawdbotCodingTools", () => {
modelAuthMode: "oauth",
});
const names = new Set(tools.map((tool) => tool.name));
expect(names.has("bash")).toBe(true);
expect(names.has("exec")).toBe(true);
expect(names.has("read")).toBe(true);
expect(names.has("write")).toBe(true);
expect(names.has("edit")).toBe(true);
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ describe("createClawdbotCodingTools", () => {
expect(names.has("sessions_spawn")).toBe(false);
expect(names.has("read")).toBe(true);
expect(names.has("bash")).toBe(true);
expect(names.has("exec")).toBe(true);
expect(names.has("process")).toBe(true);
});
@@ -330,7 +330,7 @@ describe("createClawdbotCodingTools", () => {
browserAllowHostControl: false,
};
const tools = createClawdbotCodingTools({ sandbox });
expect(tools.some((tool) => tool.name === "bash")).toBe(true);
expect(tools.some((tool) => tool.name === "exec")).toBe(true);
expect(tools.some((tool) => tool.name === "read")).toBe(false);
expect(tools.some((tool) => tool.name === "browser")).toBe(false);
});
@@ -371,7 +371,7 @@ describe("createClawdbotCodingTools", () => {
const tools = createClawdbotCodingTools({
config: { tools: { deny: ["browser"] } },
});
expect(tools.some((tool) => tool.name === "bash")).toBe(true);
expect(tools.some((tool) => tool.name === "exec")).toBe(true);
expect(tools.some((tool) => tool.name === "browser")).toBe(false);
});

View File

@@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ import {
resolveAgentIdFromSessionKey,
} from "./agent-scope.js";
import {
type BashToolDefaults,
createBashTool,
createExecTool,
createProcessTool,
type ExecToolDefaults,
type ProcessToolDefaults,
} from "./bash-tools.js";
import { createClawdbotTools } from "./clawdbot-tools.js";
@@ -290,9 +290,18 @@ function cleanToolSchemaForGemini(schema: Record<string, unknown>): unknown {
return cleanSchemaForGemini(schema);
}
const TOOL_NAME_ALIASES: Record<string, string> = {
bash: "exec",
};
function normalizeToolName(name: string) {
const normalized = name.trim().toLowerCase();
return TOOL_NAME_ALIASES[normalized] ?? normalized;
}
function normalizeToolNames(list?: string[]) {
if (!list) return [];
return list.map((entry) => entry.trim().toLowerCase()).filter(Boolean);
return list.map(normalizeToolName).filter(Boolean);
}
const DEFAULT_SUBAGENT_TOOL_DENY = [
@@ -354,7 +363,7 @@ function isToolAllowedByPolicy(name: string, policy?: SandboxToolPolicy) {
const deny = new Set(normalizeToolNames(policy.deny));
const allowRaw = normalizeToolNames(policy.allow);
const allow = allowRaw.length > 0 ? new Set(allowRaw) : null;
const normalized = name.trim().toLowerCase();
const normalized = normalizeToolName(name);
if (deny.has(normalized)) return false;
if (allow) return allow.has(normalized);
return true;
@@ -467,7 +476,7 @@ function wrapToolWithAbortSignal(
}
export function createClawdbotCodingTools(options?: {
bash?: BashToolDefaults & ProcessToolDefaults;
exec?: ExecToolDefaults & ProcessToolDefaults;
messageProvider?: string;
agentAccountId?: string;
sandbox?: SandboxContext | null;
@@ -495,14 +504,14 @@ export function createClawdbotCodingTools(options?: {
/** Mutable ref to track if a reply was sent (for "first" mode). */
hasRepliedRef?: { value: boolean };
}): AnyAgentTool[] {
const bashToolName = "bash";
const execToolName = "exec";
const sandbox = options?.sandbox?.enabled ? options.sandbox : undefined;
const { agentId, policy: effectiveToolsPolicy } = resolveEffectiveToolPolicy({
config: options?.config,
sessionKey: options?.sessionKey,
});
const scopeKey =
options?.bash?.scopeKey ?? (agentId ? `agent:${agentId}` : undefined);
options?.exec?.scopeKey ?? (agentId ? `agent:${agentId}` : undefined);
const subagentPolicy =
isSubagentSessionKey(options?.sessionKey) && options?.sessionKey
? resolveSubagentToolPolicy(options.config)
@@ -524,7 +533,7 @@ export function createClawdbotCodingTools(options?: {
const freshReadTool = createReadTool(workspaceRoot);
return [createClawdbotReadTool(freshReadTool)];
}
if (tool.name === bashToolName) return [];
if (tool.name === "bash" || tool.name === execToolName) return [];
if (tool.name === "write") {
if (sandboxRoot) return [];
return [createWriteTool(workspaceRoot)];
@@ -535,8 +544,8 @@ export function createClawdbotCodingTools(options?: {
}
return [tool as AnyAgentTool];
});
const bashTool = createBashTool({
...options?.bash,
const execTool = createExecTool({
...options?.exec,
cwd: options?.workspaceDir,
allowBackground,
scopeKey,
@@ -550,7 +559,7 @@ export function createClawdbotCodingTools(options?: {
: undefined,
});
const processTool = createProcessTool({
cleanupMs: options?.bash?.cleanupMs,
cleanupMs: options?.exec?.cleanupMs,
scopeKey,
});
const tools: AnyAgentTool[] = [
@@ -563,7 +572,7 @@ export function createClawdbotCodingTools(options?: {
]
: []
: []),
bashTool as unknown as AnyAgentTool,
execTool as unknown as AnyAgentTool,
processTool as unknown as AnyAgentTool,
// Provider docking: include provider-defined agent tools (login, etc.).
...listProviderAgentTools({ cfg: options?.config }),

View File

@@ -110,13 +110,13 @@ describe("workspace path resolution", () => {
});
});
it("defaults bash cwd to workspaceDir when workdir is omitted", async () => {
it("defaults exec cwd to workspaceDir when workdir is omitted", async () => {
await withTempDir("clawdbot-ws-", async (workspaceDir) => {
const tools = createClawdbotCodingTools({ workspaceDir });
const bashTool = tools.find((tool) => tool.name === "bash");
expect(bashTool).toBeDefined();
const execTool = tools.find((tool) => tool.name === "exec");
expect(execTool).toBeDefined();
const result = await bashTool?.execute("ws-bash", {
const result = await execTool?.execute("ws-exec", {
command: "echo ok",
});
const cwd =
@@ -134,14 +134,14 @@ describe("workspace path resolution", () => {
});
});
it("lets bash workdir override the workspace default", async () => {
it("lets exec workdir override the workspace default", async () => {
await withTempDir("clawdbot-ws-", async (workspaceDir) => {
await withTempDir("clawdbot-override-", async (overrideDir) => {
const tools = createClawdbotCodingTools({ workspaceDir });
const bashTool = tools.find((tool) => tool.name === "bash");
expect(bashTool).toBeDefined();
const execTool = tools.find((tool) => tool.name === "exec");
expect(execTool).toBeDefined();
const result = await bashTool?.execute("ws-bash-override", {
const result = await execTool?.execute("ws-exec-override", {
command: "echo ok",
workdir: overrideDir,
});

View File

@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ describe("Agent-specific sandbox config", () => {
sandbox: {
tools: {
allow: ["read"],
deny: ["bash"],
deny: ["exec"],
},
},
},

View File

@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ const DEFAULT_SANDBOX_WORKDIR = "/workspace";
const DEFAULT_SANDBOX_IDLE_HOURS = 24;
const DEFAULT_SANDBOX_MAX_AGE_DAYS = 7;
const DEFAULT_TOOL_ALLOW = [
"bash",
"exec",
"process",
"read",
"write",

View File

@@ -9,14 +9,14 @@ describe("sanitizeToolUseResultPairing", () => {
role: "assistant",
content: [
{ type: "toolCall", id: "call_1", name: "read", arguments: {} },
{ type: "toolCall", id: "call_2", name: "bash", arguments: {} },
{ type: "toolCall", id: "call_2", name: "exec", arguments: {} },
],
},
{ role: "user", content: "user message that should come after tool use" },
{
role: "toolResult",
toolCallId: "call_2",
toolName: "bash",
toolName: "exec",
content: [{ type: "text", text: "ok" }],
isError: false,
},

View File

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ describe("buildAgentSystemPrompt", () => {
it("lists available tools when provided", () => {
const prompt = buildAgentSystemPrompt({
workspaceDir: "/tmp/clawd",
toolNames: ["bash", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "sessions_send"],
toolNames: ["exec", "sessions_list", "sessions_history", "sessions_send"],
});
expect(prompt).toContain("Tool availability (filtered by policy):");
@@ -49,13 +49,13 @@ describe("buildAgentSystemPrompt", () => {
it("preserves tool casing in the prompt", () => {
const prompt = buildAgentSystemPrompt({
workspaceDir: "/tmp/clawd",
toolNames: ["Read", "Bash", "process"],
toolNames: ["Read", "Exec", "process"],
skillsPrompt:
"<available_skills>\n <skill>\n <name>demo</name>\n </skill>\n</available_skills>",
});
expect(prompt).toContain("- Read: Read file contents");
expect(prompt).toContain("- Bash: Run shell commands");
expect(prompt).toContain("- Exec: Run shell commands");
expect(prompt).toContain(
"Use `Read` to load the SKILL.md at the location listed for that skill.",
);
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ describe("buildAgentSystemPrompt", () => {
it("adds ClaudeBot self-update guidance when gateway tool is available", () => {
const prompt = buildAgentSystemPrompt({
workspaceDir: "/tmp/clawd",
toolNames: ["gateway", "bash"],
toolNames: ["gateway", "exec"],
});
expect(prompt).toContain("## Clawdbot Self-Update");

View File

@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@ export function buildAgentSystemPrompt(params: {
grep: "Search file contents for patterns",
find: "Find files by glob pattern",
ls: "List directory contents",
bash: "Run shell commands",
process: "Manage background bash sessions",
exec: "Run shell commands",
process: "Manage background exec sessions",
// Provider docking: add provider login tools here when a provider needs interactive linking.
browser: "Control web browser",
canvas: "Present/eval/snapshot the Canvas",
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ export function buildAgentSystemPrompt(params: {
"grep",
"find",
"ls",
"bash",
"exec",
"process",
"browser",
"canvas",
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ export function buildAgentSystemPrompt(params: {
const hasGateway = availableTools.has("gateway");
const readToolName = resolveToolName("read");
const bashToolName = resolveToolName("bash");
const execToolName = resolveToolName("exec");
const processToolName = resolveToolName("process");
const extraSystemPrompt = params.extraSystemPrompt?.trim();
const ownerNumbers = (params.ownerNumbers ?? [])
@@ -195,8 +195,8 @@ export function buildAgentSystemPrompt(params: {
"- grep: search file contents for patterns",
"- find: find files by glob pattern",
"- ls: list directory contents",
`- ${bashToolName}: run shell commands (supports background via yieldMs/background)`,
`- ${processToolName}: manage background bash sessions`,
`- ${execToolName}: run shell commands (supports background via yieldMs/background)`,
`- ${processToolName}: manage background exec sessions`,
"- browser: control clawd's dedicated browser",
"- canvas: present/eval/snapshot the Canvas",
"- nodes: list/describe/notify/camera/screen on paired nodes",
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ export function buildAgentSystemPrompt(params: {
)}`
: "",
params.sandboxInfo.elevated?.allowed
? "Elevated bash is available for this session."
? "Elevated exec is available for this session."
: "",
params.sandboxInfo.elevated?.allowed
? "User can toggle with /elevated on|off."
@@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ export function buildAgentSystemPrompt(params: {
params.sandboxInfo.elevated?.allowed
? `Current elevated level: ${
params.sandboxInfo.elevated.defaultLevel
} (on runs bash on host; off runs in sandbox).`
} (on runs exec on host; off runs in sandbox).`
: "",
]
.filter(Boolean)
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ export function buildAgentSystemPrompt(params: {
"## Messaging",
"- Reply in current session → automatically routes to the source provider (Signal, Telegram, etc.)",
"- Cross-session messaging → use sessions_send(sessionKey, message)",
"- Never use bash/curl for provider messaging; Clawdbot handles all routing internally.",
"- Never use exec/curl for provider messaging; Clawdbot handles all routing internally.",
availableTools.has("message")
? [
"",

View File

@@ -25,9 +25,9 @@
]
},
"tools": {
"bash": {
"exec": {
"emoji": "🛠️",
"title": "Bash",
"title": "Exec",
"detailKeys": ["command"]
},
"process": {

View File

@@ -1100,7 +1100,7 @@ describe("legacy config detection", () => {
expect(res.changes).toContain("Moved agent.tools.allow → tools.allow.");
expect(res.changes).toContain("Moved agent.tools.deny → tools.deny.");
expect(res.changes).toContain("Moved agent.elevated → tools.elevated.");
expect(res.changes).toContain("Moved agent.bash → tools.bash.");
expect(res.changes).toContain("Moved agent.bash → tools.exec.");
expect(res.changes).toContain(
"Moved agent.sandbox.tools → tools.sandbox.tools.",
);
@@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ describe("legacy config detection", () => {
enabled: true,
allowFrom: { discord: ["user:1"] },
});
expect(res.config?.tools?.bash).toEqual({ timeoutSec: 12 });
expect(res.config?.tools?.exec).toEqual({ timeoutSec: 12 });
expect(res.config?.tools?.sandbox?.tools).toEqual({
allow: ["browser.open"],
});

View File

@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ const LEGACY_CONFIG_RULES: LegacyConfigRule[] = [
{
path: ["agent"],
message:
"agent.* was moved; use agents.defaults (and tools.* for tool/elevated/bash settings) instead (run `clawdbot doctor` to migrate).",
"agent.* was moved; use agents.defaults (and tools.* for tool/elevated/exec settings) instead (run `clawdbot doctor` to migrate).",
},
{
path: ["agent", "model"],
@@ -819,9 +819,11 @@ const LEGACY_CONFIG_MIGRATIONS: LegacyConfigMigration[] = [
const bash = getRecord(agent.bash);
if (bash) {
if (tools.bash === undefined) {
tools.bash = bash;
changes.push("Moved agent.bash → tools.bash.");
if (tools.exec === undefined && tools.bash === undefined) {
tools.exec = bash;
changes.push("Moved agent.bash → tools.exec.");
} else if (tools.exec !== undefined) {
changes.push("Removed agent.bash (tools.exec already set).");
} else {
changes.push("Removed agent.bash (tools.bash already set).");
}

View File

@@ -972,7 +972,7 @@ export type QueueConfig = {
export type AgentToolsConfig = {
allow?: string[];
deny?: string[];
/** Per-agent elevated bash gate (can only further restrict global tools.elevated). */
/** Per-agent elevated exec gate (can only further restrict global tools.elevated). */
elevated?: {
/** Enable or disable elevated mode for this agent (default: true). */
enabled?: boolean;
@@ -1003,14 +1003,23 @@ export type ToolsConfig = {
/** Allowlist of agent ids or patterns (implementation-defined). */
allow?: string[];
};
/** Elevated bash permissions for the host machine. */
/** Elevated exec permissions for the host machine. */
elevated?: {
/** Enable or disable elevated mode (default: true). */
enabled?: boolean;
/** Approved senders for /elevated (per-provider allowlists). */
allowFrom?: AgentElevatedAllowFromConfig;
};
/** Bash tool defaults. */
/** Exec tool defaults. */
exec?: {
/** Default time (ms) before an exec command auto-backgrounds. */
backgroundMs?: number;
/** Default timeout (seconds) before auto-killing exec commands. */
timeoutSec?: number;
/** How long to keep finished sessions in memory (ms). */
cleanupMs?: number;
};
/** @deprecated Use tools.exec. */
bash?: {
/** Default time (ms) before a bash command auto-backgrounds. */
backgroundMs?: number;

View File

@@ -905,6 +905,13 @@ const ToolsSchema = z
allowFrom: ElevatedAllowFromSchema,
})
.optional(),
exec: z
.object({
backgroundMs: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
timeoutSec: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
cleanupMs: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
})
.optional(),
bash: z
.object({
backgroundMs: z.number().int().positive().optional(),

View File

@@ -419,14 +419,14 @@ describeLive("gateway live (dev agent, profile keys)", () => {
`write-${runIdTool}.txt`,
);
const bashReadProbe = await client.request<AgentFinalPayload>(
const execReadProbe = await client.request<AgentFinalPayload>(
"agent",
{
sessionKey,
idempotencyKey: `idem-${runIdTool}-bash-read`,
idempotencyKey: `idem-${runIdTool}-exec-read`,
message:
"Clawdbot live tool probe (local, safe): " +
"use the tool named `bash` (or `Bash`) to run this command: " +
"use the tool named `exec` (or `Exec`) to run this command: " +
`mkdir -p "${tempDir}" && printf '%s' '${nonceC}' > "${toolWritePath}". ` +
`Then use the tool named \`read\` (or \`Read\`) with JSON arguments {"path":"${toolWritePath}"}. ` +
"Finally reply including the nonce text you read back.",
@@ -434,15 +434,15 @@ describeLive("gateway live (dev agent, profile keys)", () => {
},
{ expectFinal: true },
);
if (bashReadProbe?.status !== "ok") {
if (execReadProbe?.status !== "ok") {
throw new Error(
`bash+read probe failed: status=${String(bashReadProbe?.status)}`,
`exec+read probe failed: status=${String(execReadProbe?.status)}`,
);
}
const bashReadText = extractPayloadText(bashReadProbe?.result);
if (!bashReadText.includes(nonceC)) {
const execReadText = extractPayloadText(execReadProbe?.result);
if (!execReadText.includes(nonceC)) {
throw new Error(
`bash+read probe missing nonce: ${bashReadText}`,
`exec+read probe missing nonce: ${execReadText}`,
);
}