fix: rename bash tool to exec (#748) (thanks @myfunc)
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@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ This is not a perfect security boundary, but it materially limits filesystem
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and process access when the model does something dumb.
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## What gets sandboxed
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- Tool execution (`bash`, `read`, `write`, `edit`, `process`, etc.).
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- Tool execution (`exec`, `read`, `write`, `edit`, `process`, etc.).
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- Optional sandboxed browser (`agents.defaults.sandbox.browser`).
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- By default, the sandbox browser auto-starts (ensures CDP is reachable) when the browser tool needs it.
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Configure via `agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.autoStart` and `agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.autoStartTimeoutMs`.
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@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ and process access when the model does something dumb.
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Not sandboxed:
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- The Gateway process itself.
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- Any tool explicitly allowed to run on the host (e.g. `tools.elevated`).
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- **Elevated bash runs on the host and bypasses sandboxing.**
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- **Elevated exec runs on the host and bypasses sandboxing.**
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- If sandboxing is off, `tools.elevated` does not change execution (already on host). See [Elevated Mode](/tools/elevated).
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## Modes
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@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ Docker installs and the containerized gateway live here:
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Tool allow/deny policies still apply before sandbox rules. If a tool is denied
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globally or per-agent, sandboxing doesn’t bring it back.
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`tools.elevated` is an explicit escape hatch that runs `bash` on the host.
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`tools.elevated` is an explicit escape hatch that runs `exec` on the host.
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Debugging:
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- Use `clawdbot sandbox explain` to inspect effective sandbox mode, tool policy, and fix-it config keys.
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