121 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
121 lines
5.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated
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summary: "Why a tool is blocked: sandbox runtime, tool allow/deny policy, and elevated exec gates"
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read_when: "You hit 'sandbox jail' or see a tool/elevated refusal and want the exact config key to change."
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status: active
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---
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# Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated
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Clawdbot has three related (but different) controls:
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1. **Sandbox** (`agents.defaults.sandbox.*` / `agents.list[].sandbox.*`) decides **where tools run** (Docker vs host).
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2. **Tool policy** (`tools.*`, `tools.sandbox.tools.*`, `agents.list[].tools.*`) decides **which tools are available/allowed**.
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3. **Elevated** (`tools.elevated.*`, `agents.list[].tools.elevated.*`) is an **exec-only escape hatch** to run on the host when you’re sandboxed.
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## Quick debug
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Use the inspector to see what Clawdbot is *actually* doing:
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```bash
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clawdbot sandbox explain
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clawdbot sandbox explain --session agent:main:main
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clawdbot sandbox explain --agent work
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clawdbot sandbox explain --json
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```
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It prints:
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- effective sandbox mode/scope/workspace access
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- whether the session is currently sandboxed (main vs non-main)
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- effective sandbox tool allow/deny (and whether it came from agent/global/default)
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- elevated gates and fix-it key paths
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## Sandbox: where tools run
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Sandboxing is controlled by `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode`:
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- `"off"`: everything runs on the host.
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- `"non-main"`: only non-main sessions are sandboxed (common “surprise” for groups/channels).
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- `"all"`: everything is sandboxed.
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See [Sandboxing](/gateway/sandboxing) for the full matrix (scope, workspace mounts, images).
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### Bind mounts (security quick check)
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- `docker.binds` *pierces* the sandbox filesystem: whatever you mount is visible inside the container with the mode you set (`:ro` or `:rw`).
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- Default is read-write if you omit the mode; prefer `:ro` for source/secrets.
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- `scope: "shared"` ignores per-agent binds (only global binds apply).
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- Binding `/var/run/docker.sock` effectively hands host control to the sandbox; only do this intentionally.
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- Workspace access (`workspaceAccess: "ro"`/`"rw"`) is independent of bind modes.
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## Tool policy: which tools exist/are callable
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Two layers matter:
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- **Tool profile**: `tools.profile` and `agents.list[].tools.profile` (base allowlist)
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- **Provider tool profile**: `tools.byProvider[provider].profile` and `agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].profile`
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- **Global/per-agent tool policy**: `tools.allow`/`tools.deny` and `agents.list[].tools.allow`/`agents.list[].tools.deny`
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- **Provider tool policy**: `tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny` and `agents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny`
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- **Sandbox tool policy** (only applies when sandboxed): `tools.sandbox.tools.allow`/`tools.sandbox.tools.deny` and `agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools.*`
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Rules of thumb:
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- `deny` always wins.
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- If `allow` is non-empty, everything else is treated as blocked.
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- Tool policy is the hard stop: `/exec` cannot override a denied `exec` tool.
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- `/exec` only changes session defaults for authorized senders; it does not grant tool access.
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Provider tool keys accept either `provider` (e.g. `google-antigravity`) or `provider/model` (e.g. `openai/gpt-5.2`).
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### Tool groups (shorthands)
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Tool policies (global, agent, sandbox) support `group:*` entries that expand to multiple tools:
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```json5
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{
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tools: {
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sandbox: {
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tools: {
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allow: ["group:runtime", "group:fs", "group:sessions", "group:memory"]
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}
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}
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}
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}
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```
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Available groups:
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- `group:runtime`: `exec`, `bash`, `process`
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- `group:fs`: `read`, `write`, `edit`, `apply_patch`
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- `group:sessions`: `sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`, `sessions_spawn`, `session_status`
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- `group:memory`: `memory_search`, `memory_get`
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- `group:ui`: `browser`, `canvas`
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- `group:automation`: `cron`, `gateway`
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- `group:messaging`: `message`
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- `group:nodes`: `nodes`
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- `group:clawdbot`: all built-in Clawdbot tools (excludes provider plugins)
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## Elevated: exec-only “run on host”
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Elevated does **not** grant extra tools; it only affects `exec`.
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- If you’re sandboxed, `/elevated on` (or `exec` with `elevated: true`) runs on the host (approvals may still apply).
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- Use `/elevated full` to skip exec approvals for the session.
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- If you’re already running direct, elevated is effectively a no-op (still gated).
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- Elevated is **not** skill-scoped and does **not** override tool allow/deny.
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- `/exec` is separate from elevated. It only adjusts per-session exec defaults for authorized senders.
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Gates:
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- Enablement: `tools.elevated.enabled` (and optionally `agents.list[].tools.elevated.enabled`)
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- Sender allowlists: `tools.elevated.allowFrom.<provider>` (and optionally `agents.list[].tools.elevated.allowFrom.<provider>`)
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See [Elevated Mode](/tools/elevated).
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## Common “sandbox jail” fixes
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### “Tool X blocked by sandbox tool policy”
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Fix-it keys (pick one):
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- Disable sandbox: `agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=off` (or per-agent `agents.list[].sandbox.mode=off`)
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- Allow the tool inside sandbox:
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- remove it from `tools.sandbox.tools.deny` (or per-agent `agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools.deny`)
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- or add it to `tools.sandbox.tools.allow` (or per-agent allow)
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### “I thought this was main, why is it sandboxed?”
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In `"non-main"` mode, group/channel keys are *not* main. Use the main session key (shown by `sandbox explain`) or switch mode to `"off"`.
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