Files
clawdbot/docs/gateway/sandboxing.md
2026-01-20 15:00:25 +00:00

175 lines
6.5 KiB
Markdown
Raw Blame History

This file contains ambiguous Unicode characters
This file contains Unicode characters that might be confused with other characters. If you think that this is intentional, you can safely ignore this warning. Use the Escape button to reveal them.
---
summary: "How Clawdbot sandboxing works: modes, scopes, workspace access, and images"
title: Sandboxing
read_when: "You want a dedicated explanation of sandboxing or need to tune agents.defaults.sandbox."
status: active
---
# Sandboxing
Clawdbot can run **tools inside Docker containers** to reduce blast radius.
This is **optional** and controlled by configuration (`agents.defaults.sandbox` or
`agents.list[].sandbox`). If sandboxing is off, tools run on the host.
The Gateway stays on the host; tool execution runs in an isolated sandbox
when enabled.
This is not a perfect security boundary, but it materially limits filesystem
and process access when the model does something dumb.
## What gets sandboxed
- Tool execution (`exec`, `read`, `write`, `edit`, `apply_patch`, `process`, etc.).
- Optional sandboxed browser (`agents.defaults.sandbox.browser`).
- By default, the sandbox browser auto-starts (ensures CDP is reachable) when the browser tool needs it.
Configure via `agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.autoStart` and `agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.autoStartTimeoutMs`.
- `agents.defaults.sandbox.browser.allowHostControl` lets sandboxed sessions target the host browser explicitly.
- Optional allowlists gate `target: "custom"`: `allowedControlUrls`, `allowedControlHosts`, `allowedControlPorts`.
Not sandboxed:
- The Gateway process itself.
- Any tool explicitly allowed to run on the host (e.g. `tools.elevated`).
- **Elevated exec runs on the host and bypasses sandboxing.**
- If sandboxing is off, `tools.elevated` does not change execution (already on host). See [Elevated Mode](/tools/elevated).
## Modes
`agents.defaults.sandbox.mode` controls **when** sandboxing is used:
- `"off"`: no sandboxing.
- `"non-main"`: sandbox only **non-main** sessions (default if you want normal chats on host).
- `"all"`: every session runs in a sandbox.
Note: `"non-main"` is based on `session.mainKey` (default `"main"`), not agent id.
Group/channel sessions use their own keys, so they count as non-main and will be sandboxed.
## Scope
`agents.defaults.sandbox.scope` controls **how many containers** are created:
- `"session"` (default): one container per session.
- `"agent"`: one container per agent.
- `"shared"`: one container shared by all sandboxed sessions.
## Workspace access
`agents.defaults.sandbox.workspaceAccess` controls **what the sandbox can see**:
- `"none"` (default): tools see a sandbox workspace under `~/.clawdbot/sandboxes`.
- `"ro"`: mounts the agent workspace read-only at `/agent` (disables `write`/`edit`/`apply_patch`).
- `"rw"`: mounts the agent workspace read/write at `/workspace`.
Inbound media is copied into the active sandbox workspace (`media/inbound/*`).
Skills note: the `read` tool is sandbox-rooted. With `workspaceAccess: "none"`,
Clawdbot mirrors eligible skills into the sandbox workspace (`.../skills`) so
they can be read. With `"rw"`, workspace skills are readable from
`/workspace/skills`.
## Custom bind mounts
`agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.binds` mounts additional host directories into the container.
Format: `host:container:mode` (e.g., `"/home/user/source:/source:rw"`).
Global and per-agent binds are **merged** (not replaced). Under `scope: "shared"`, per-agent binds are ignored.
Example (read-only source + docker socket):
```json5
{
agents: {
defaults: {
sandbox: {
docker: {
binds: [
"/home/user/source:/source:ro",
"/var/run/docker.sock:/var/run/docker.sock"
]
}
}
},
list: [
{
id: "build",
sandbox: {
docker: {
binds: ["/mnt/cache:/cache:rw"]
}
}
}
]
}
}
```
Security notes:
- Binds bypass the sandbox filesystem: they expose host paths with whatever mode you set (`:ro` or `:rw`).
- Sensitive mounts (e.g., `docker.sock`, secrets, SSH keys) should be `:ro` unless absolutely required.
- Combine with `workspaceAccess: "ro"` if you only need read access to the workspace; bind modes stay independent.
- See [Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated](/gateway/sandbox-vs-tool-policy-vs-elevated) for how binds interact with tool policy and elevated exec.
## Images + setup
Default image: `clawdbot-sandbox:bookworm-slim`
Build it once:
```bash
scripts/sandbox-setup.sh
```
Note: the default image does **not** include Node. If a skill needs Node (or
other runtimes), either bake a custom image or install via
`sandbox.docker.setupCommand` (requires network egress + writable root +
root user).
Sandboxed browser image:
```bash
scripts/sandbox-browser-setup.sh
```
By default, sandbox containers run with **no network**.
Override with `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.network`.
Docker installs and the containerized gateway live here:
[Docker](/install/docker)
## setupCommand (one-time container setup)
`setupCommand` runs **once** after the sandbox container is created (not on every run).
It executes inside the container via `sh -lc`.
Paths:
- Global: `agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.setupCommand`
- Per-agent: `agents.list[].sandbox.docker.setupCommand`
Common pitfalls:
- Default `docker.network` is `"none"` (no egress), so package installs will fail.
- `readOnlyRoot: true` prevents writes; set `readOnlyRoot: false` or bake a custom image.
- `user` must be root for package installs (omit `user` or set `user: "0:0"`).
- Sandbox exec does **not** inherit host `process.env`. Use
`agents.defaults.sandbox.docker.env` (or a custom image) for skill API keys.
## Tool policy + escape hatches
Tool allow/deny policies still apply before sandbox rules. If a tool is denied
globally or per-agent, sandboxing doesnt bring it back.
`tools.elevated` is an explicit escape hatch that runs `exec` on the host.
Debugging:
- Use `clawdbot sandbox explain` to inspect effective sandbox mode, tool policy, and fix-it config keys.
- See [Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated](/gateway/sandbox-vs-tool-policy-vs-elevated) for the “why is this blocked?” mental model.
Keep it locked down.
## Multi-agent overrides
Each agent can override sandbox + tools:
`agents.list[].sandbox` and `agents.list[].tools` (plus `agents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools` for sandbox tool policy).
See [Multi-Agent Sandbox & Tools](/multi-agent-sandbox-tools) for precedence.
## Minimal enable example
```json5
{
agents: {
defaults: {
sandbox: {
mode: "non-main",
scope: "session",
workspaceAccess: "none"
}
}
}
}
```
## Related docs
- [Sandbox Configuration](/gateway/configuration#agentsdefaults-sandbox)
- [Multi-Agent Sandbox & Tools](/multi-agent-sandbox-tools)
- [Security](/gateway/security)