Files
clawdbot/extensions/voice-call/src/webhook-security.ts
2026-01-18 20:03:13 -08:00

459 lines
12 KiB
TypeScript

import crypto from "node:crypto";
import type { WebhookContext } from "./types.js";
/**
* Validate Twilio webhook signature using HMAC-SHA1.
*
* Twilio signs requests by concatenating the URL with sorted POST params,
* then computing HMAC-SHA1 with the auth token.
*
* @see https://www.twilio.com/docs/usage/webhooks/webhooks-security
*/
export function validateTwilioSignature(
authToken: string,
signature: string | undefined,
url: string,
params: URLSearchParams,
): boolean {
if (!signature) {
return false;
}
// Build the string to sign: URL + sorted params (key+value pairs)
let dataToSign = url;
// Sort params alphabetically and append key+value
const sortedParams = Array.from(params.entries()).sort((a, b) =>
a[0] < b[0] ? -1 : a[0] > b[0] ? 1 : 0,
);
for (const [key, value] of sortedParams) {
dataToSign += key + value;
}
// HMAC-SHA1 with auth token, then base64 encode
const expectedSignature = crypto
.createHmac("sha1", authToken)
.update(dataToSign)
.digest("base64");
// Use timing-safe comparison to prevent timing attacks
return timingSafeEqual(signature, expectedSignature);
}
/**
* Timing-safe string comparison to prevent timing attacks.
*/
function timingSafeEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {
if (a.length !== b.length) {
// Still do comparison to maintain constant time
const dummy = Buffer.from(a);
crypto.timingSafeEqual(dummy, dummy);
return false;
}
const bufA = Buffer.from(a);
const bufB = Buffer.from(b);
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(bufA, bufB);
}
/**
* Reconstruct the public webhook URL from request headers.
*
* When behind a reverse proxy (Tailscale, nginx, ngrok), the original URL
* used by Twilio differs from the local request URL. We use standard
* forwarding headers to reconstruct it.
*
* Priority order:
* 1. X-Forwarded-Proto + X-Forwarded-Host (standard proxy headers)
* 2. X-Original-Host (nginx)
* 3. Ngrok-Forwarded-Host (ngrok specific)
* 4. Host header (direct connection)
*/
export function reconstructWebhookUrl(ctx: WebhookContext): string {
const { headers } = ctx;
const proto = getHeader(headers, "x-forwarded-proto") || "https";
const forwardedHost =
getHeader(headers, "x-forwarded-host") ||
getHeader(headers, "x-original-host") ||
getHeader(headers, "ngrok-forwarded-host") ||
getHeader(headers, "host") ||
"";
// Extract path from the context URL (fallback to "/" on parse failure)
let path = "/";
try {
const parsed = new URL(ctx.url);
path = parsed.pathname + parsed.search;
} catch {
// URL parsing failed
}
// Remove port from host (ngrok URLs don't have ports)
const host = forwardedHost.split(":")[0] || forwardedHost;
return `${proto}://${host}${path}`;
}
function buildTwilioVerificationUrl(
ctx: WebhookContext,
publicUrl?: string,
): string {
if (!publicUrl) {
return reconstructWebhookUrl(ctx);
}
try {
const base = new URL(publicUrl);
const requestUrl = new URL(ctx.url);
base.pathname = requestUrl.pathname;
base.search = requestUrl.search;
return base.toString();
} catch {
return publicUrl;
}
}
/**
* Get a header value, handling both string and string[] types.
*/
function getHeader(
headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>,
name: string,
): string | undefined {
const value = headers[name.toLowerCase()];
if (Array.isArray(value)) {
return value[0];
}
return value;
}
/**
* Result of Twilio webhook verification with detailed info.
*/
export interface TwilioVerificationResult {
ok: boolean;
reason?: string;
/** The URL that was used for verification (for debugging) */
verificationUrl?: string;
/** Whether we're running behind ngrok free tier */
isNgrokFreeTier?: boolean;
}
/**
* Verify Twilio webhook with full context and detailed result.
*
* Handles the special case of ngrok free tier where signature validation
* may fail due to URL discrepancies (ngrok adds interstitial page handling).
*/
export function verifyTwilioWebhook(
ctx: WebhookContext,
authToken: string,
options?: {
/** Override the public URL (e.g., from config) */
publicUrl?: string;
/** Allow ngrok free tier compatibility mode (less secure) */
allowNgrokFreeTier?: boolean;
/** Skip verification entirely (only for development) */
skipVerification?: boolean;
},
): TwilioVerificationResult {
// Allow skipping verification for development/testing
if (options?.skipVerification) {
return { ok: true, reason: "verification skipped (dev mode)" };
}
const signature = getHeader(ctx.headers, "x-twilio-signature");
if (!signature) {
return { ok: false, reason: "Missing X-Twilio-Signature header" };
}
// Reconstruct the URL Twilio used
const verificationUrl = buildTwilioVerificationUrl(ctx, options?.publicUrl);
// Parse the body as URL-encoded params
const params = new URLSearchParams(ctx.rawBody);
// Validate signature
const isValid = validateTwilioSignature(
authToken,
signature,
verificationUrl,
params,
);
if (isValid) {
return { ok: true, verificationUrl };
}
// Check if this is ngrok free tier - the URL might have different format
const isNgrokFreeTier =
verificationUrl.includes(".ngrok-free.app") ||
verificationUrl.includes(".ngrok.io");
if (isNgrokFreeTier && options?.allowNgrokFreeTier) {
console.warn(
"[voice-call] Twilio signature validation failed (proceeding for ngrok free tier compatibility)",
);
return {
ok: true,
reason: "ngrok free tier compatibility mode",
verificationUrl,
isNgrokFreeTier: true,
};
}
return {
ok: false,
reason: `Invalid signature for URL: ${verificationUrl}`,
verificationUrl,
isNgrokFreeTier,
};
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Plivo webhook verification
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
/**
* Result of Plivo webhook verification with detailed info.
*/
export interface PlivoVerificationResult {
ok: boolean;
reason?: string;
verificationUrl?: string;
/** Signature version used for verification */
version?: "v3" | "v2";
}
function normalizeSignatureBase64(input: string): string {
// Canonicalize base64 to match Plivo SDK behavior (decode then re-encode).
return Buffer.from(input, "base64").toString("base64");
}
function getBaseUrlNoQuery(url: string): string {
const u = new URL(url);
return `${u.protocol}//${u.host}${u.pathname}`;
}
function timingSafeEqualString(a: string, b: string): boolean {
if (a.length !== b.length) {
const dummy = Buffer.from(a);
crypto.timingSafeEqual(dummy, dummy);
return false;
}
return crypto.timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(a), Buffer.from(b));
}
function validatePlivoV2Signature(params: {
authToken: string;
signature: string;
nonce: string;
url: string;
}): boolean {
const baseUrl = getBaseUrlNoQuery(params.url);
const digest = crypto
.createHmac("sha256", params.authToken)
.update(baseUrl + params.nonce)
.digest("base64");
const expected = normalizeSignatureBase64(digest);
const provided = normalizeSignatureBase64(params.signature);
return timingSafeEqualString(expected, provided);
}
type PlivoParamMap = Record<string, string[]>;
function toParamMapFromSearchParams(sp: URLSearchParams): PlivoParamMap {
const map: PlivoParamMap = {};
for (const [key, value] of sp.entries()) {
if (!map[key]) map[key] = [];
map[key].push(value);
}
return map;
}
function sortedQueryString(params: PlivoParamMap): string {
const parts: string[] = [];
for (const key of Object.keys(params).sort()) {
const values = [...params[key]].sort();
for (const value of values) {
parts.push(`${key}=${value}`);
}
}
return parts.join("&");
}
function sortedParamsString(params: PlivoParamMap): string {
const parts: string[] = [];
for (const key of Object.keys(params).sort()) {
const values = [...params[key]].sort();
for (const value of values) {
parts.push(`${key}${value}`);
}
}
return parts.join("");
}
function constructPlivoV3BaseUrl(params: {
method: "GET" | "POST";
url: string;
postParams: PlivoParamMap;
}): string {
const hasPostParams = Object.keys(params.postParams).length > 0;
const u = new URL(params.url);
const baseNoQuery = `${u.protocol}//${u.host}${u.pathname}`;
const queryMap = toParamMapFromSearchParams(u.searchParams);
const queryString = sortedQueryString(queryMap);
// In the Plivo V3 algorithm, the query portion is always sorted, and if we
// have POST params we add a '.' separator after the query string.
let baseUrl = baseNoQuery;
if (queryString.length > 0 || hasPostParams) {
baseUrl = `${baseNoQuery}?${queryString}`;
}
if (queryString.length > 0 && hasPostParams) {
baseUrl = `${baseUrl}.`;
}
if (params.method === "GET") {
return baseUrl;
}
return baseUrl + sortedParamsString(params.postParams);
}
function validatePlivoV3Signature(params: {
authToken: string;
signatureHeader: string;
nonce: string;
method: "GET" | "POST";
url: string;
postParams: PlivoParamMap;
}): boolean {
const baseUrl = constructPlivoV3BaseUrl({
method: params.method,
url: params.url,
postParams: params.postParams,
});
const hmacBase = `${baseUrl}.${params.nonce}`;
const digest = crypto
.createHmac("sha256", params.authToken)
.update(hmacBase)
.digest("base64");
const expected = normalizeSignatureBase64(digest);
// Header can contain multiple signatures separated by commas.
const provided = params.signatureHeader
.split(",")
.map((s) => s.trim())
.filter(Boolean)
.map((s) => normalizeSignatureBase64(s));
for (const sig of provided) {
if (timingSafeEqualString(expected, sig)) return true;
}
return false;
}
/**
* Verify Plivo webhooks using V3 signature if present; fall back to V2.
*
* Header names (case-insensitive; Node provides lower-case keys):
* - V3: X-Plivo-Signature-V3 / X-Plivo-Signature-V3-Nonce
* - V2: X-Plivo-Signature-V2 / X-Plivo-Signature-V2-Nonce
*/
export function verifyPlivoWebhook(
ctx: WebhookContext,
authToken: string,
options?: {
/** Override the public URL origin (host) used for verification */
publicUrl?: string;
/** Skip verification entirely (only for development) */
skipVerification?: boolean;
},
): PlivoVerificationResult {
if (options?.skipVerification) {
return { ok: true, reason: "verification skipped (dev mode)" };
}
const signatureV3 = getHeader(ctx.headers, "x-plivo-signature-v3");
const nonceV3 = getHeader(ctx.headers, "x-plivo-signature-v3-nonce");
const signatureV2 = getHeader(ctx.headers, "x-plivo-signature-v2");
const nonceV2 = getHeader(ctx.headers, "x-plivo-signature-v2-nonce");
const reconstructed = reconstructWebhookUrl(ctx);
let verificationUrl = reconstructed;
if (options?.publicUrl) {
try {
const req = new URL(reconstructed);
const base = new URL(options.publicUrl);
base.pathname = req.pathname;
base.search = req.search;
verificationUrl = base.toString();
} catch {
verificationUrl = reconstructed;
}
}
if (signatureV3 && nonceV3) {
const method =
ctx.method === "GET" || ctx.method === "POST" ? ctx.method : null;
if (!method) {
return {
ok: false,
version: "v3",
verificationUrl,
reason: `Unsupported HTTP method for Plivo V3 signature: ${ctx.method}`,
};
}
const postParams = toParamMapFromSearchParams(new URLSearchParams(ctx.rawBody));
const ok = validatePlivoV3Signature({
authToken,
signatureHeader: signatureV3,
nonce: nonceV3,
method,
url: verificationUrl,
postParams,
});
return ok
? { ok: true, version: "v3", verificationUrl }
: {
ok: false,
version: "v3",
verificationUrl,
reason: "Invalid Plivo V3 signature",
};
}
if (signatureV2 && nonceV2) {
const ok = validatePlivoV2Signature({
authToken,
signature: signatureV2,
nonce: nonceV2,
url: verificationUrl,
});
return ok
? { ok: true, version: "v2", verificationUrl }
: {
ok: false,
version: "v2",
verificationUrl,
reason: "Invalid Plivo V2 signature",
};
}
return {
ok: false,
reason: "Missing Plivo signature headers (V3 or V2)",
verificationUrl,
};
}